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Purpose: To study tax motivated transfer pricing from the perspective of stakeholder theory and le-
gitimacy theory in hope of finding out the motives for corporations to engage in transfer pricing ma-
nipulation and whether tax avoidance behavior via manipulating transfer pricing will cause a legiti-
macy problem. 
Method: This paper predominantly employs the qualitative method with a complement of quantita-
tive method. A small survey and interviews with seven major Swedish media companies are con-
ducted in order to find out the public attitude towards tax planning. 
Theoretical perspective: This study is based on transfer pricing theory, stakeholder theory and legit-
imacy theory. A brief introduction of the concept of tax planning, tax haven and “fairness” social 
norm are also presented.  
Empirical data: Multinational corporations’ tax avoidance mechanism is presented via four cases. 
The general public’s attitudes towards corporations’ tax avoidance behavior in any form are also pre-
sented through various survey results. Our own survey and interviews with seven major Swedish 
media companies are also presented in order to reveal the fact – the lack of public concern on corpo-
rations’ tax planning behavior in the society. 
Conclusion: Multinational corporations have both internal and external motives to manipulate trans-
fer pricing in order to shift their profits between high- and low-tax jurisdictions. Theoretically, mul-
tinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior will cause legitimacy problem. However, in reality 
such a behavior does not really endanger their legitimacy and thus legitimacy theory is not applicable 
for the issue of tax planning. 
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Abstract 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) or Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) are of great importance in 
the global economy. A great amount of international trade is either between multinational corpora-
tions or within a multinational corporation, which is called intra-firm trade. Therefore, intra-firm 
trade is also of importance in the global economy. The price used in intra-firm trade is called transfer 
price. The process of deciding the transfer price refers to transfer pricing, which is an important 
strategy for multinational corporations to shift their global pre-tax profit from high tax jurisdictions 
to low tax jurisdictions for the purpose of tax avoidance. 
As major participants of the global economy, multinational corporations and governments view 
transfer pricing differently. Corporations regard transfer pricing strategy as an important tool for tax 
planning, which is consistent with their professional ethics, because the ultimate goal of the corpora-
tion is profit maximization. Therefore, corporations have strong motivations to manipulate transfer 
pricing for the tax purpose. However, tax avoidance behavior is a conflictual behavior. From the 
government’s perspective, it is harmful because such a behavior causes loss of tax revenue, which 
could be used to fulfill public spending obligations such as financing public infrastructure, national 
defense, education, health care, social security and other public services. 
The purpose of this paper is to study tax motivated transfer pricing from the perspective of stake-
holder theory and legitimacy theory in hope of finding out the motives for corporations to engage in 
transfer pricing manipulation, and whether tax avoidance behavior via manipulating transfer pricing 
will cause a legitimacy problem. In order to do so, we examined both cases related to tax avoidance 
via transfer pricing manipulation and regulations involving transfer pricing, OECD guidelines in par-
ticular. We also conducted a small survey and telephone interviews with seven Swedish media com-
panies in order to find out the public attitude towards tax planning. 
We try to analyze corporations’ conflictual behavior from both a theoretical and practical perspective, 
and then compare them with each other. We also try to provide an explanation for the result of the 
comparison and extend our analysis to the question: Is legitimacy theory applicable to the issue of 
tax planning? Last but not least, some suggestions about reducing tax motivated transfer pricing ma-
nipulation are presented. 
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Abbreviation 
APA   The advance pricing agreement process  
BEPS   The Action Plan on Base Erosion and profit Shifting  
CUP Method  Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method 
DISA   Du Pont International S.A. 
EBITA  Earnings before interest, tax, amortization and exceptional items 
FATF   Financial Action Task Force  
FTSE 100  The 100 biggest groups listed on the London Stock Exchange  
GAO   Government Accountability Office of the United States 
HMRC  Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs  
IBE   Institute of Business of Ethics 
IMF   The International Monetary Fund  
MNC / MNE  Multinational Corporation / Multinational Enterprise 
OECD   Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFC   Offshore financial center  
TPM   Transfer pricing manipulation 
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
WVS   World Value Survey  
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1. Introduction 
Introduction presents a background and problem discussion about transfer pricing, which leads to 
the purpose of this paper. The structure of this paper is also presented in the later part of introduc-
tion. 
1.1. Background 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are of great importance in the global economy. In the past half 
century, the number and economic influence of multinational corporations have grown steadily 
(Ghemawat & Pisani, 2013).  According to World Investment Report 2010 (UNCTAD, 2010, p.16), 
there are 889,416 multinational corporations worldwide in 2009, among which 82,053 mother 
corporations each have almost 10 affiliates. Since 2009, the world has seen the great economic 
recession as a result of the global financial crisis. However, large multinational corporations are still 
playing the predominant role in international trade because trade between and within MNCs 
represents a large share of the global trade. World Investment Report 2013 (UNCTAD, 2013: XV) 
states that “FDI stocks rose by 9 per cent in 2012… Foreign affiliate of TNCs (transnational 
corporations) generated sales worth $26 trillion … increasing 7.4 per cent from 2011.  They 
contributed value added worth $ 6.6 trillion, up 5.5 per cent, which compares well with global GDP 
growth of 2.3 per cent.”  
Furthermore, a large amount of international trade involves foreign affiliates of multinational 
corporations. Ernst & Young’s 2013 global transfer pricing survey mentions that “according to the 
OECD (Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development), around 60% of world trade 
actually takes place within multinational enterprises” (Ernst & Young, 2013, p.3). Trade within a 
multinational corporation refers to intra-firm trade and the price related to intra-firm trade is transfer 
price. Anthony and Govindarajan (2007, p.230) mentioned in their book Management Control 
Systems that “79 percent of Fortune 1,000 companies transferred products between profit centers”. 
As per World Investment Report 2010 from UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development),  exports of goods and services by multinational corporations and their affiliates 
account for one third of global exports in 2009 (UNCTAD, 2010, p.16). 48 percent of goods imports 
and 30 percent of goods exports in United States were intra-firm trade in 2009 (Lanz, R. & S. 
Miroudot, 2011, p.5). “58% of US goods imports from OECD countries were intra-firm.” (Lanz, R. 
& S. Miroudot, 2011, p.6) In Sweden, one of the countries with the highest share of intra-firm trade, 
51 percent of total manufacturing exports were intra-firm trade (Lanz, R. & S. Miroudot, 2011, p.5). 
Multinational corporations can set price for intra-firm trade, i.e. transfer price. Transfer pricing is the 
process of establishing price for a transaction of goods or services between two parties within one 
organization (Benari, 2009, p.2). How multinational corporations set their transfer prices has been a 
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hot topic for decades. Transfer pricing has an inherent problem, which is the difficulty for setting a 
fair price in absence of two unrelated parties in a transaction. Price of goods and services in 
transactions between unrelated parties is usually affected by certain market factors, for example, 
supply and demand, tariffs or political conditions, while intra-firm trade often ignores these market 
factors (Benari, 2009, p.2).   
Looking from a global view, transfer pricing between affiliates across borders brings about further 
complications related to tax planning (Benari, 2009, p.2). Different regulations and taxation systems 
in different countries make it possible for multinational corporations to exploit the differences in tax 
rates and to maximize their profits via manipulating transfer pricing. A great many cases of tax 
planning related to transfer pricing manipulation are reported. A classic case of profit shifting via 
transfer pricing strategy is Du Pont de Nemours. Investigation about EF Education First led by 
Swedish TV program “Uppdrag granskning” in 2013 is another example. 
Du Pont de Nemours Case 
Du Pont de Nemours was a chemical company and it created a marketing and sales subsidiary – Du 
Pont International S.A. (“DISA”) – in Switzerland in 1959. The subsidiary distributed chemical 
products outside America. Du Pont’s internal memoranda kept records of tax advantages, especially 
in planning prices of goods to be sold to DISA. According to court documents, the tax strategy was 
that “Du Pont sold its goods to DISA at prices below fair market value. DISA, upon resale of the 
goods, would recognize the greater part of the total profit (i.e. manufacturing and selling profits). 
Since this foreign subsidiary could be located in a country where its profits would be taxed at a much 
lower level than the parent Du Pont would be taxed here, the enterprise as a whole would minimize 
its taxes.” (Leagle, 1979)  
EF Education First 
EF Education First, founded in the Swedish university town – Lund 1965, is nowadays the biggest 
privately owned international education company, which offers culture exchange, educational travel 
and language study programs worldwide. The organization has more than 400 schools in over 50 
countries. As per Uppdrag granskning, EF Education First generates millions of revenue but presents 
only minimum of profits and thus hardly pays any taxes. (Aftonbladet, 2013) 
Uppdrag granskning asserts that the corporation’s foreign affiliates and daughter companies are 
transferring profits to different central accounts (central konton) and then receive just enough capital 
for covering the cost of business operations. In addition, the company’s headquarters, which is 
located in Lucerne, Switzerland, distributes the overhead costs to foreign affiliates and daughter 
companies with the aim of minimizing the profits which would be taxed in the host countries. 
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Anonymous sources within EF Education First claim that the effective tax planning via transfer 
pricing is credited with the profit maximization of whole organization (Ljunggren & Sandelin, 2013). 
1.2. Problem discussion & Purposes 
1.2.1. Problem discussion 
Multinational corporations and governments are major participants in the global economy and they 
view transfer pricing differently.  
Multinational corporations 
Transfer pricing per se is just about setting price for the transactions within an organization. It does 
not say anything about whether the price is over-priced, underpriced or set according to arm’s length 
principle.  Multinational corporations have an incentive to misprice transfer price for the purpose of 
minimizing tax in view of their primary goal of profit maximization. Therefore, transfer pricing, 
from the perspective of organization’s’ top management, is a significant strategic decision due to its 
importance in creating shareholder wealth.  
Governments 
For a long time, the world has known and worried about the dark side of transfer pricing, especially 
when it is related to developing countries. One of the most discussed problems is related to taxation. 
Many million dollar tax disputes, such as Xilinx and Veritas Software tax fraud case share one 
common question – Is abusive manipulation of transfer pricing employed for tax evasion or tax fraud 
purposes (Leone, 2011)? After the Du Pont case in 1979, companies were required to record their 
transfer pricing strategies. A guideline about transfer pricing by multinational corporations and 
income taxation was made by OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) 
and is reviewed on a regular basis. Many countries built up various bilateral and/or multilateral 
agreements involving transfer pricing based on the OECD guidelines (Eden & Murphy, 2011, p.3). 
The primary norm involving transfer pricing is arm’s length principle, which refers to that the 
transfer price should be based on the price that two unrelated parties negotiate for the identical or 
similar product traded on the active market (Eden, Dacin & Wan, 2001). 
The focus of regulations and taxation laws are on aggressive or abusive transfer pricing manipulation 
which most probably leads to tax evasion or tax fraud. Tax planning involving tax avoidance is 
considered to be legal, or more exactly, not illegal. Multinational corporations’ tax avoidance 
behavior is morally acceptable to government and tax authorities, at least based on the interpretation 
of current regulations and taxation laws.  
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Insomuch as multinational corporations and intra-firm trades are of importance in the world 
economy; major players (multinational corporations and government) in the global economy have 
different views on transfer pricing, it is necessary to further the study of transfer pricing 
manipulation. 
Stakeholders of multinational corporations are paying more and more attention to transfer pricing 
risk management. Ernst & Young’s 2013 Global Transfer Pricing Survey stated that “the 2011-2012 
Tax Risk and Controversy Survey found 57% of tax administrators identified transfer pricing as their 
top risk focus” and almost 40 percent of companies “identified transfer pricing as their leading risk” 
(Ernst &  Young, 2013, p.4). There has been a sharp increase in tax controversy worldwide, 
especially regarding transfer pricing. Transfer pricing and tax “fairness” nowadays have become hot 
topics in the news around world. British Prime Minister David Cameron thinks that multinationals’ 
aggressive tax avoidance is like illegal evasion. Cameron said on February 18, 2013: 
 “There are some forms of tax avoidance that have become so aggressive that I think there are moral 
questions we have to answer about whether we want to encourage or allow that sort of behavior.” 
(Bloomberg, February 18, 2013) 
In order to achieve shareholder wealth maximization, multinational corporations are in need of 
reducing cost as much as possible, including minimizing the tax costs in all manner of ways such as 
transfer pricing strategies. On the other hand, tax avoidance behavior in any form and in any measure 
is becoming more and more intolerable to government, tax authority and the general public. 
Multinational corporations need to operate within the bounds and norms of society, i.e. to legitimate 
their business activities in order to win the “license to operate”. Therefore, multinational 
corporations’ tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing manipulation is a conflictual behavior 
which could endanger corporations’ legitimacy. 
1.2.2.  Purposes 
The aim of this paper is to study multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior via transfer 
pricing manipulation, especially profit shifting from a high-tax jurisdiction to a low-tax jurisdiction. 
From the perspective of stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory, we will try to understand 
multinational corporations’ conflictual behavior – tax avoidance via transfer pricing manipulation by 
providing the answers to the following questions. 
 What are the motives for multinational corporations to engage in transfer pricing 
manipulation? 
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 Will tax avoidance behavior via manipulating transfer pricing eventually lead to legitimacy 
problem for multinational corporations? 
1.3. Structure 
After this part, we will introduce the method of our study. After that, followed by empirical data, 
related theories such as transfer pricing, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory will be introduced. 
Empirical materials are focusing on two aspects. One is multinational corporations’ profit shifting 
mechanism by taking advantage of transfer pricing and tax haven. This will be presented in the form 
of case description. Another focus of empirical data is on the public’s attitudes to tax avoidance.  
In our analysis part, we will discuss transfer pricing manipulation from four aspects. First, we will 
analyze the motives for multinational corporations to engage in transfer pricing manipulation. 
Secondly, from the perspective of stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory, we try to understand and 
explain the legitimacy problem involving tax motivated transfer pricing manipulation. Thirdly, 
compared with the theoretical result about legitimacy problem, we present a different result in reality: 
tax motivated transfer pricing manipulation does not cause a legitimacy problem. Fourthly, in order 
to find out whether legitimacy theory is applicable for the issue of tax planning, we try to analyze the 
difference between theory and reality and provide an answer for it. 
The conclusion and discussion part summarizes the analysis and offers answers to the questions 
mentioned in the purpose section. A discussion about reducing multinational corporations’ tax 
motivated transfer pricing manipulation is also presented.  
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2. Method 
This part discusses and motivates which research methods are used in our study. The methods for 
data collecting and data analyzing are presented; the credibility/reliability of empirical data is dis-
cussed; and in the end, limitations for this paper are described.  
2.1. Choice of Topic  
As an important tool for internal management control, transfer pricing is considered to be a strategic 
decision. Numerous research on transfer prices have been done and multitudinous studies have 
focused on business ethics and business sustainability. However, there are not many studies focusing 
on the conflict between multinational corporations’ profit maximization goal and the legitimacy of 
tax avoidance behavior involving transfer pricing strategies. Therefore, this conflict deserves a 
further study. In addition, we think it is interesting and important to understand the possible 
legitimacy problem caused by the tax motivated transfer pricing manipulation.  
2.2. Data 
2.2.1. Primary Data and Secondary Data 
Primary data is the first-hand data which researchers collect in person through, for example, 
interviews or surveys. Secondary data is what is already in databases, archives and other forms of 
materials such as academic papers, journals, literature books, newspapers, etc.  
Our study is based on both primary data and secondary data. However, most of the work is based on 
the research of secondary data, because the topic of the study – tax avoidance via transfer pricing 
manipulation – is a hot but very sensitive topic. Thus it is, on one hand, hard for us to get access to 
the fresh first hand data through the normal primary data collecting methods; on the other hand, a 
large amount of related second hand data is available for our study, since it is now such a hot topic 
among academic researchers and politicians.    
Two decisive factors can explain our difficulties. First, transfer pricing is considered to be a 
significant corporate strategy and it is often regarded by most corporations as an important secrecy. 
Secondly, transfer pricing strategy is a prominent source of tax controversy. Multinational 
corporations use tax haven to shift profits for the purpose of avoiding corporate income tax. Such a 
behavior has an elaborate disguise and the lack of transparency for the transactions through “Tax 
Haven” often makes it difficult even for tax authorities to identify or find solid proofs for 
corporations’ actual process of operation. Hence, we think, it is better to use the secondary data from 
trustworthy sources as the ground for our study, since it can avoid the problem that analysis and 
conclusion are jeopardized because of unsound or even false data.   
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In order to analyze whether tax avoidance behavior will create a threat to corporations’ legitimacy, 
we complement our study with primary data by conducting a small survey involving 50 randomly 
selected people in different lines of business with various academic backgrounds. We also conducted 
telephone interviews with seven major Swedish media companies. The detailed information about 
the survey and interviews will be presented in 2.2.2 Data Collection and Processing. 
Out of the reasons mentioned above, we decided to ground our study on both primary and secondary 
data and we read widely about theories, research papers and newspaper articles, as well as 
regulations and laws related to transfer pricing. Information is collected with the help of course 
literature, database of Lund university library and google search engine on the internet.  
2.2.2. Data Collection and Processing 
Global Regulations and Cases of Transfer Pricing Manipulation 
As our aim is to understand the tax avoidance by shifting profits between high- and low-tax jurisdic-
tions via transfer pricing strategies, we are focusing on searching for data on how multinational cor-
porations actually operate in practice. That is to say, how do multinational corporations manipulate 
transfer pricing to shift their pre-tax global profits through tax havens for the purpose of tax avoid-
ance? We also study the general global regulations involving transfer pricing, especially the arm’s 
length principle. 
In order to elaborate multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing 
manipulation, we choose altogether four cases to show how corporations actually operate in practice. 
Even if all cases share the same characteristic – profit shifting through tax havens by manipulating 
transfer pricing, each case has its individual focus. That is the negative effects of tax avoidance 
exerted on different aspects. We think that, combined with stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory, 
those cases could provide a revealing insight for understanding multinational corporations’ 
conflictual behavior (tax avoidance behavior) and the possible legitimacy problem arising from it. 
We also chose to present those corporations’ current financial performances for the purpose of 
gauging the effect of the possible legitimacy problem induced by tax planning. 
Survey and Interviews about General Public’s View towards Tax Planning 
In order to study the possible legitimacy problem, we need to know the public attitudes towards 
multinational corporations’ tax planning behavior. Therefore, we conducted a small survey involving 
25 randomly selected people from various lines of business in a common Swedish community and 25 
students with various academic backgrounds at Lund University. 25 people are regular Swedish 
citizens and except two retired persons, all others have different types of jobs, such as office 
workers, sales representatives, electrical engineers, craftsmen and entrepreneurs. Among the 25 
14 
 
students from Lund University, there are four students from Business Administration and two 
students from Economics. Others are from different majors, such as Engineering, Math, Psychology, 
Biomedicine, and Chemistry.  
We chose to conduct the survey in a form of conversation with people randomly passing by in the 
community and in the campus. In order to know where tax planning lies in the general public’s 
ranking and why it lies in that position, we first asked them to rank four issues, environmental 
problem, low salary, child labor and tax planning, in today’s society. Then, we asked them to 
motivate the reason for why they rank it in this way. 
The result of survey motivated us to further our study by interviewing the major Swedish media 
outlets. We conducted telephone interviews with five newspapers, Dagens nyheter, Sydsvenskan, 
Aftonbladet, Svenska Dagbladet and Metro. We also interviewed two TV stations, SVT Nyheter and 
TV4 Nyheter, because many people access news via television. The interview questions are listed as 
following: 
1. How do you rank the news reporting interest for the following alternatives? 
a) Environment problems (such as pollution) 
b) Low wages (than allowed) 
c) Child labor 
d) Tax planning (with a focus on tax avoidance) 
2. Why do you rank them in this way?  
3. Please motivate the reasons for why tax planning has not been widely reported in Swedish 
media? 
Data collection is a repeated ongoing process during our writing. We collect the data and then assess, 
process, group and analyze the data. Based on the data available, we adjust the angle of research and 
if necessary, we continue the data collection and processing work during the analysis stage. 
2.3. Qualitative and Quantitative method 
Quantitative method refers to that the reality is observed with the help of certain mathematical 
measures and statistics study. Qualitative method does not use mathematical measures and statistics 
study as a tool for research, i.e. qualitative method uses word description instead of using numbers 
(Backman, 2008, p.33). 
We choose to predominantly employ the qualitative method with a complement of quantitative 
method. We choose to do so, because there are many research materials suitable for our study, such 
as cases of tax avoidance via transfer pricing manipulation, laws and regulations related to transfer 
pricing as well. Even if the mathematical or statistical data in a broad range is hard to get access to, a 
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small survey and seven telephone interviews with the major Swedish media companies were 
conducted in order to find out the public attitudes towards tax planning, which we think, is necessary 
and beneficial to our study. 
2.4. Choice of Theory 
Choice of Theory has to fulfill the requirement of research paper’s purpose. One of the purposes of 
our paper is to understand the possible legitimacy problem which is created by multinational 
corporations’ tax avoidance behavior involving transfer pricing manipulation. We think it is 
necessary to give a brief introduction about transfer price and transfer pricing theory. An important 
part of transfer pricing is the OECD guidelines, the arm’s length principle in particular. Laws and 
regulations related to transfer pricing in a lot of countries are based on the guidelines. It would be 
impossible for us to go through every country’s legislation. We therefore chose to use the OECD 
guidelines, because it gives us a general understanding of laws concerning transfer pricing in most 
countries.  
One question we try to answer in this paper is: “what are the motives for multinational corporations 
to engage in transfer pricing manipulation?”  Transfer pricing is an important tool for tax planning 
and tax havens provide the arbitrage opportunities for corporations’ tax planning behavior. Thus, we 
think it is necessary to introduce the concept of tax planning and tax haven. 
In order to analyze the legitimacy problem for multinational corporations’ tax motivated transfer 
pricing behavior, we choose to do our analysis based on stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory 
with a complimentary introduction about the social norm “fairness” in hope of proving there should 
be a legitimacy problem for corporations’ tax avoidance behavior.  
Out of above reasoning, we think our theory framework is appropriate and suitable to conduct the 
study for understanding multinational corporations’ tax motivated transfer pricing manipulation.  
2.5. Research Procedure 
Our research procedure includes 7 phases: 1) choosing topic; 2) formulating problem; 3) literature 
study; 4) collecting data; 5) processing data; 6) analysis based on theory and empirical data; and 7) 
conclusion and suggestions.  
1) Choosing Topic: In the starting phase, we discussed about various choices of topic which we 
are interested in for our study. We decided to choose tax motivated transfer pricing as our 
topic, because on one hand, it is interesting to us; on the other hand, there are enough 
resources available for conducting our study. 
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2) Formulating Problem: Based on a broad reading of various literatures and academic papers, 
we formulated the problems on which we would like to do further study. This stage of work 
also makes a good preparation for the next stage of work. With the development and 
deepening of our study, the purpose of the study has undergone several minor adjustments in 
order to provide a better understanding of the research topic. 
3) Literature Study: During the stage of literature study, we reviewed literatures and academic 
studies carefully and selected theories that, we think, are necessary and most relevant to 
combine with the empirical data for the analysis work. 
4) Collecting Data: Data (majorly empirical data) collection was separated into two stages. 
First, we collected all the empirical data related to multinational corporations’ actual 
mechanism for manipulating transfer pricing for tax purpose and the general public attitudes 
towards tax avoidance through various sources, such as newspapers, web pages and academic 
papers. The second stage of empirical data collection work (survey and interviews about tax 
planning) was triggered by questions raised during the analysis work. Therefore, we decided 
to conduct a small survey and interviews with the major Swedish media companies in order 
to solve our confusions and complete our analysis. 
5)  Processing Data: During the stage of data processing, we organized all the collected data 
and discussed how we should combine it with selected literatures for the analysis.  
6) Analysis: Analysis can be divided into two parts. First, we analyzed multinational 
corporations’ tax motivated transfer pricing manipulation behavior and its possible legitimacy 
problem based on the selected theory and empirical data, especially four cases of the actual 
mechanism for shifting profits between high- and low-jurisdictions; Then we compared the 
situation in reality and furthered the study of the possible legitimacy problem in reality and 
provided an answer for the difference between the theoretical and practical results. 
7) Conclusion and Suggestion: Conclusion is the product of the analysis. In this stage, we also 
furthered our discussion about the research topic in hope of providing useful and practical 
suggestions. 
2.6. Source Criticism 
Credibility / Reliability of Empirical Data 
The topic of this paper, transfer pricing manipulation for tax planning, is a very sensitive topic. It is 
understandable that most companies would not like to reveal their actual operational mechanism 
related to tax motivated transfer pricing strategies. It then creates the difficulty for us to get access to 
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primary data through any first-hand data collecting methods such as survey or interview with 
companies. Therefore, we choose to research on previous studies related to transfer pricing 
manipulation.  
While we were reading widely about all kinds of materials from various sources, we found that there 
are a large amount of literatures about transfer pricing and multinational corporations’ profit shifting 
behavior. But few studies actually present empirical evidence of the profit shifting mechanism by 
manipulating transfer pricing. On the other hand, cases for explaining how multinational 
corporations work with their transfer pricing strategies always make the headlines on various 
newspapers. Besides academic research papers, we thus decided to select some cases reported in 
newspapers as our empirical data for showing multinational corporations’ actual profit shifting 
mechanism via transfer pricing manipulation.  
We understand the importance of credibility/reliability of empirical data, since it has a direct bearing 
on the correctness of our analysis and results. Therefore, we carefully selected cases reported by the 
big and reputable newspapers and news reports based on the actual law cases in the hope of ensuring 
the credibility of our empirical data.  
2.7. Limitations 
This paper focuses only on tax motivated transfer pricing manipulation with the purpose of shifting 
profit from a high jurisdiction to a low jurisdiction. We will not discuss other issues related to profit 
shifting via transfer pricing manipulation out of motivations such as tariffs, export taxes, foreign 
exchange risks or political risks.  
As for the analysis of the related global regulations of transfer pricing, we are primarily focusing on 
OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the arm’s length principle in particular. The study is mainly 
taking a global perspective and it is not focusing on any specific country.    
Our study is majorly based on secondary data through various books, academic papers and 
newspaper articles. The main disadvantage of using secondary data is the data collected might not be 
a perfect fit for supporting the purpose of the study. For example, as for the public attitude towards 
tax avoidance in OECD countries, data for all OECD countries are not available. We choose to 
present the result of Tekeli’s (2011) study based on World Value Survey 2005-2006, because it is the 
most complete data available for showing the public attitudes to tax cheating. 
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3. Literature Overview 
This part first presents theory about transfer price and transfer pricing in global context and then 
transfer pricing method as per OECD guideline, the arm’s length principle. Legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory are presented with a complementary description of fairness and the social norm. 
In the end, a brief description of tax planning and tax haven are presented. 
3.1. Transfer Pricing  
3.1.1. Transfer Price and Transfer Pricing 
The thinking of the business world has long been decentralization and one of essential feature of de-
centralized organization is responsibility center, which is often evaluated based on various account-
ing numbers, as well as certain non-accounting measures. One primary challenge for decentralized 
organization is attaching those accounting numbers to transactions between various responsibility 
centers, i.e. an appropriate method of accounting for intra-firm trade should be constructed if a sig-
nificant amount of such trade exists (Heath & Slotta, 2009, p.1). Transfer prices are constructed for 
internal management control of various responsibility centers, especially for cost and profit centers 
(Eden & Smith, 2011, p.10). In a broad sense, transfer price refers to “the amount used in accounting 
for any transfer of goods and services between responsibility centers” (Anthony& Govindarajan, 
2007, p.230). A narrow definition of transfer price given by Anthony and Govindarajan (2007) in 
Management Control System is “the value placed on a transfer of goods or services in transactions in 
which at least one of the two parties involved is a profit center” (Anthony & Govindarajan, 2007, 
p.230).  Transfer pricing is used to describe intra-firm pricing arrangement between related business 
entities (Bairstow, 2011, p.3). 
3.1.2. Objectives of transfer pricing 
Transfer price is a mechanism for distributing revenue when more than one business unit is involved 
in the development, manufacturing, marketing and sales of a product line. There are several predom-
inant objectives for constructing an appropriate transfer price scheme according to some researchers 
(Heath & Slotta, 2009, p.2; Anthony & Govindarajan, 2007, p.230; Lanz, Ceder & Larsson, 2002, 
p.7). 
 Help coordinate different units responsible for different functions involving developing, pro-
ducing, marketing and sales of a specified product line; help coordinate their pricing deci-
sions and minimize risk of conflicts. 
 Each unit generates profit or cost separately via transfer pricing, which thereby acts as a 
ground for their economic performance measurement.  
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 Induce goal congruent decisions – transfer price scheme should be constructed on the basis 
that decision of individual unit for profit maximization will be consistent with the profit max-
imization goal of organization as a whole. 
 Transfer pricing system should be “simple to understand and easy to administer” (Anthony & 
Govindarajan, 2007, p.230).  
3.1.3.  Transfer pricing in global context  
Globalization can be interpreted as a new word of “internationalization”. According to Scholte 
(2005)  “ Globalization is a process which diminishes the necessity of a common and shared territo-
rial basis for social, economic, and political activities, processes and relations” (Crane & Matten, 
2010, p.19).  
Globalization makes it possible for resources to move freely cross borders. Organizations can estab-
lish affiliates, subsidiaries, joint ventures, etc without territorial limitations. Globalization creates 
new complexities for transfer pricing policy making, because multinational corporations can take 
advantage of low taxes in different geographical locations (Sikka & Willmott, 2010, p. 345). The In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) proclaims that globalization causes taxation problems related to 
“potential use and abuse of transfer prices” by multinational corporations (Tanzi, 2000, p.10). 
Internalization benefit of transfer prices 
With the development of a global value chain, intra-firm trade across borders is growing at a tremen-
dous pace. Multinational corporations can take advantage of the incompletely integrated world mar-
ket and semi-globalization to create additional values via cross-border intercompany transactions. 
(Eden, 2003, p.3). An appropriate transfer price scheme can help enhance multinational corporations’ 
competitiveness in the international market, facilitate management of cash flow, motivate subsidiary 
managers and thereby induce goal congruence (Bairstow, 2011). 
Intercompany transactions nowadays involve more contents such as tangible, intangible property and 
finance transfers. Issues related to transfer pricing are becoming more and more complex. Tax plan-
ning is one principal issue related to transfer pricing. Sikka and Willmott (2010, p. 343) mentioned in 
their research paper that Ernst & Young proclaimed in its transfer pricing global reference guide 
2005 as following:  
“Transfer pricing continues to be, and will remain, the most important international tax issue facing 
MNEs” (Ernst & Young, 2006, p.5).  
Different taxation regulations in various countries offer opportunities for multinational corporations 
to reduce taxes and tariffs. Eden (2003) stated that an appropriate transfer pricing system helps avoid 
20 
 
tax conflicts with home and host governments and minimize foreign exchange risks. Through trans-
fer pricing manipulation, multinational corporations can shift profit artificially from a high-tax juris-
diction to a low-tax jurisdiction and thereby present a better financial performance. Moreover, organ-
ization can reduce capital cost and achieve higher after-tax profit via transfer pricing system. There-
fore, transfer pricing manipulation is a value adding activity which can create additional benefit from 
internalizing markets and shareholder wealth (Eden, 2003, p.3).  
Problems of transfer pricing manipulation 
Resource allocation is another issue related to transfer pricing.  Researchers discovered long time 
ago that transfer pricing manipulation can result in resources misallocation. In a global context, be-
sides loss of income tax and custom duties, transfer pricing manipulations can have other potential 
negative impacts for the host country, such as “depletion of natural resources, environmental damage, 
health hazards, increased national debt and poverty, psychological feelings of betrayal and loss of 
trust in MNEs, and economic colonialism” (Eden & Smith, 2011). Some researchers state that trans-
fer pricing is a tool for capital flight. It is “not just an accounting technique but also a method of re-
source allocation and avoidance of taxes that affects distribution of income, wealth, risks and quality 
of life” (Sikka & Willnott, 2010, p.352). Capital shifting and tax avoidance raise questions about the 
quality of national economic statistics because most governments steer the economy based on the 
“data of imports, exports, national income, corporate profitability, balance of payments and terms of 
trade”, which is problematized by multinational corporations’ transfer pricing policies (Sikka & 
Willnott, 2010, p. 353). 
3.1.4. Transfer Pricing methods As Per OECD Guideline 
Arm’s Length Principle 
Arm's length principle is the accepted international transfer pricing standard by OECD member 
countries for taxation purposes of MNEs (Multinational Enterprises). In article 9 of the OECD 
Model Tax Convention the arm's length principle is stated as follows: 
“Conditions are made or imposed between the two enterprises in their commercial or financial 
relations which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any 
profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason 
of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed 
accordingly.” (Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention) 
When MNEs do intra-firm trade between countries, they should use transfer prices as it would be 
used between unrelated independent companies.  But how should the transfer price be calculated as 
per the arm’s length principle? 
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1) Comparable Uncontrolled Price Method (CUP Method) 
This method compares the price charged for property or services transferred in a controlled transac-
tion to the price charged for property or services transferred in a comparable uncontrolled transaction 
in comparable circumstances. If a difference in the two prices indicates that the pricing is not accord-
ing to arm's length principle, the controlled price might need to be substituted by the uncontrolled 
price. This is the most direct way to apply the arm's length principle. (OECD, 2010 p 63) 
An uncontrolled transaction is considered to be comparable to the controlled transaction if one of 
either two conditions are met: " a) none of the differences (if any) between the transactions being 
compared or between the enterprises undertaking those transactions could materially affect the price 
in the open market; or, b) reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the material 
effects of such differences." (OECD, 2010, p.63) 
Problems with using this method are that it's not always easy or possible to find a similar transaction 
to compare with. Even if there is one, it could materially affect the price. It may also be difficult to 
determine the adjustments that need to be made in order to eliminate the effect of the price differ-
ence. When determining the adjustments, there are lots of things that need to be considered. For ex-
ample, are the products being sold the same or very similar? Do they have the same quality and 
quantity? Are they in the same time frame, in the same stage of the production/distribution chain and 
under similar conditions? This is, however, dependent on the available data. If no accurate data is 
available then a different method should be chosen. (OECD, 2010, p.63-65) 
2) Resale price method 
Resale price method changes the perspective to for which price a product in intra-firm trade would 
be resold to an independent enterprise without taking the gross margin into account. This means that 
the arm's length price is considered to be the price of the product after subtracting profit, risk 
coverage, selling and operating expenses as well as costs for the actual purchase such as customs 
cost. (OECD, 2010, p.65-66) 
One way to figure out the resale price margin of the reseller in the controlled transaction is by using 
the resale price margin that the same reseller would use in an uncontrolled transaction. Another way 
is to use an independent enterprise in a comparable uncontrolled transaction as a reference point. If 
the resale price margin is related to a brokerage fee, then it should follow the same principles as the 
CUP method. The difference is that the resale price margin is used instead of the price. (OECD, 2010, 
p. 66-67) 
An uncontrolled transaction is considered to be comparable to the controlled transaction if one of 
either two conditions are met: "a) none of the differences (if any) between the transactions being 
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compared or between the enterprises undertaking those transactions could materially affect the 
resale price margin in the open market; or, b) reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to 
eliminate the material effects of such differences." (OECD, 2010, p.66) 
Generally speaking, minor product differences have a smaller effect on the profit margin as they do 
on price. This means that using resale price method tends to require fewer adjustments for product 
differences than using the CUP method. For example, if a distribution company is performing the 
same task, whether it is selling toaster or blenders, the gross profit margin could be comparable.  If 
we are focusing on the products themselves, toasters and blenders obviously are not substitutes for 
each other. It is however important to remember that comparing similar products will give a better 
comparability and when comparing things like valuable or unique intangibles, it may be harder to get 
a good comparison and a high attention might need to be paid to the product. This also means that if 
the circumstances are similar in all aspects except the product itself, then resale price method can 
give a more reliable comparison then using CUP method. (OECD, 2010, p.67-68) 
There are two instances where the resale price method would be a bad choice. One is when a resale 
adds a lot of value to the product, such as when they are further processed or incorporated into 
something. The other is when intangible property is associated with the product, such as trademarks, 
and the reseller substantially contributes to the creation or maintenance of this. Another important 
factor is time between the original purchase and the resale, the more time that passes, the higher the 
risk that other factors affect the price. (OECD, 2010, p.67-69) 
If there is a chain of distribution within the MNE and if an intermediate company is involved, tax 
administrators are urged to not only look at the resale price of the goods but also to look at the price 
such a company paid to its own supplier as well to look at the activities and role of the intermediate 
company to see if it bears an economic risk or adds value to the goods since independent enterprises 
would otherwise not normally let such a company share in the profits. Another important point is that 
adjustments need to be made if the accounting practices used by the companies between the 
controlled and uncontrolled transactions differ. An example of this is how gross profit margin is 
affected by the way research and development can be reflected in operating expenses or cost of sales. 
(OECD, 2010, p.67-69) 
3) Cost Plus Method  
The cost plus method takes the perspective from the costs incurred by the supplier and then applies 
cost plus markup to the cost that the supplier would need in order to make an appropriate profit 
considering the functions performed and the market. The marked up costs can be considered as the 
arm's length price of the original controlled transaction. One way to establish the cost markup of the 
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supplier in the controlled transaction is by using the cost markup that the same supplier would use in 
an uncontrolled transaction. Another way is to use the cost markup from an independent enterprise in 
a comparable uncontrolled transaction as a reference point. The same principles concerning product 
differences for resale price margin can be applied to the cost plus method. By doing so, cost plus 
method can be used in a broader sense and fewer adjustments need to be made comparing with using 
the CUP method. Companies can have differences in how effective they are at manufacturing and 
such differences need to be taking into account when comparing the cost markup price between 
different companies. (OECD, 2010, p.70-71) 
An uncontrolled transaction is considered to be comparable to the controlled transaction if one of 
either two conditions are met: “a) none of the differences (if any) between the transactions being 
compared or between the enterprises undertaking those transactions materially affect the cost plus 
markup in the open market; or, b) reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate the 
material effects of such differences.” (OECD, 2010, p.71) 
Sometimes it can be problematic to apply the cost plus method since the level of costs is not always 
linked to the market price. Another difficulty is that the comparable markup must be compared to a 
comparable cost basis. If one supplier is using leased business assets while the other is using owned, 
then the costs might not be comparable with each other if there are no adjustments. Factors that can 
have an effect on the markup size need to be analyzed in order to be able to do the proper 
adjustments. That is why it is so important to consider different types of expenses, such as operating 
and nonoperating expenses including financing expenditures, associated with functions performed 
and risks assumed by the parties or transactions being compared. (OECD 2010, p.72-75) 
As with the resale method, it is important, when using cost plus method, to look at the accounting 
practices of the enterprises being compared as well as the accounting consistency. The same types of 
costs need to be used in each case. Generally speaking, direct costs and indirect costs of production 
will be used in the cost plus method. However, besides those two costs, the net profit method would 
count the operating expenses as well. Variations in practice among countries may therefore cause 
problems when using cost plus method. (OECD 2010, p.72-75) 
Historical costs should be attributed to individual units of production. However, some costs such as 
materials, labor, manufacturing and transport vary over time, it is therefore most probably 
appropriate to average the costs over a period of time. The cost plus method is limited to the 
supplier’s costs which can cause problems if overhead costs are not properly split among the buyer 
and the supplier in an MNE. The buyer could carry some of the supplier’s costs, thereby diminishing 
the supplier’s cost base. A follow up problem here is how to properly split the overhead costs. 
Should we use turnover, number of employees or something else? (OECD 2010, p.72-75) 
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Sometimes a good basis could be only using marginal or variable costs because transactions 
represent a disposal of marginal production. This is however dependent on factors such as 
information on the percentage of the production that is claimed to be marginal production; whether 
the MNE could sell the products at a higher price in a foreign market; and whether they have sales of 
other or similar products. (OECD 2010, p.72-75) 
3.2. Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory states that organizations strive towards being perceived as legitimate by operating 
within the bounds and norms of the society. Bounds and norms of the society are changing over time, 
thus organizations have to “be responsive to ethical (or moral) environment in which they operate” 
(Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p. 323).  
3.2.1. Legitimacy and legitimation 
What is legitimacy? Deegan and Unerman (2011) agree with Lindblom’s idea of distinguishing be-
tween legitimacy and legitimation. Legitimacy is “a status or condition”; while legitimation is “the 
process that leads to an organization being adjudged legitimate” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p. 324). 
In their book Financial Accounting Theory, Deegan and Unerman (2011) quote Lindblom (1993, p.2) 
that legitimacy is “a condition which exists when an entity’s value system is congruent with the va l-
ue system of the larger social system of which the entity is part.”  
Legitimacy theory treats legitimacy as a resource that is necessary for an organization’s survival 
(Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.324). Thus organizations will pursue the appropriate legitimation strat-
egies for a continued supply of such a necessary resource in order to gain, maintain or repair legiti-
macy (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.324). The importance does not lie in what the organization actu-
ally does but rather in “what society collectively knows or perceives about the organizations conduct” 
(Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.324). 
3.2.2. Public Expectations, Social Contract and Legitimacy Gap 
Social Contract 
Social contract, in legitimacy theory, is a theoretical contract between the organization and the socie-
ty in which it operates. The social contract incorporates the society’s norms and expectations, both 
implicit and explicit, about how an organization should conduct its operations (Deegan & Unerman, 
2011, p.325-328).  
Traditionally, the optimal corporate performance is considered to be profit maximization. However, 
as social expectations have evolved over time, the focus of society’s expectations has shifted towards 
some social issues such as environment, health and safety of consumers and employees (Deegan & 
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Unerman, 2011, p.325). Failure to comply with those “heightened social expectations” (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2011, p.325) brings a breach of the social contract, which may lead to sanctions being im-
posed by society on the organization (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.325).  
Legitimacy theory stresses that an organization should consider “the rights of the public at large, not 
merely those of its investors” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.325). “Organizations are not considered 
to have an inherent right towards resources” and they need to earn this right (Deegan & Unerman, 
2011, p.325). Therefore, “license to operate” and legitimacy go hand in hand. (Deegan & Unerman, 
2011, p.325-326).  
Social Contract and Law 
Social contract has both explicit and implicit terms. Explicit terms are often related to legal require-
ments; while the implicit terms are those non-legislated societal expectations (Deegan & Unerman, 
2011, p.328).  According to Deegan and Unerman (2011), “there is an imperfect correlation between 
the law and social norms (as reflected by the social contract)”. Based on the research work of 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), Deegan and Unerman (2011) summarized the following three reasons 
for the difference (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.328). 
 “Even though laws are reflective of societal norms and values, legal systems are slow to 
adapt to changes in the norms and values in society.” 
 “Legal systems often strive for consistency whereas societal norms and expectations can be 
contradictory.” 
 “While society may not be accepting of certain behaviours, it may not be willing or struc-
tured enough to have those behavioural restrictions codified within law.” 
Legitimacy Gap 
The term “legitimacy gap” is used to describe situations where there is “a lack of correspondence 
between how society believes organization should act and how it is perceived that the organization 
has acted” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.329). The sources of “legitimacy gap” are mainly 1) socie-
tal expectations have changed, while the organization is still operating in the same old way; 2) the 
news media discloses certain previously unknown information about the organization. (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2011, p.329-330) 
3.2.3. Gaining, Maintaining or Repairing Legitimacy 
When it comes to the issue of gaining, maintaining or repairing legitimacy, organizations will choose 
different legitimation tactics depending on their different needs to do with their current legitimacy 
(Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.331).  “Gaining legitimacy occurs when an organization moves into a 
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new area of operations in which it has no past reputation.” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.331) Strate-
gies for maintaining legitimacy include both forecasting future changes and protecting past accom-
plishments (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.331). The greater extent an organization’s trade is depend-
ent on legitimacy, the stronger the need that the organization will have to maintain its current legiti-
macy (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.332). Strategies for repairing legitimacy are often the reactive 
response to unforeseen crises (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.332). Organizations can employ legiti-
mation strategies through using accounting reports, since annual reports is a way of public disclosure 
of information (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.333-334).  
Deegan and Unerman (2011) quotes Lindblom’s (1993) four courses of actions to gain, maintain or 
repair legitimacy:  
 An organization can educate and inform its ‘relevant publics’ about changes of its actions 
which  are consistent with society’s values and expectations; 
 An organization can try to change the society’s perceptions of  its actions without actually 
changing its behavior; 
 An organization can try to manipulate the society’s perception by deflecting the attention 
away from the issue of concern to other issues;  
 And an organization can attempt to change the society’s expectations of its actions (Deegan 
& Unerman, 2011, p.333).   
3.2.4. Reputation Risk Management 
In recent years, gaining and maintaining legitimacy is more about building or maintaining an organi-
zation’s reputation. Reputation risk management is a notion created under such circumstances. It in-
dicates the financial importance of legitimacy to organizations (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.336). A 
corporation’s reputation is considered to be “a resource of considerable (if normally unquantified) 
value in generating future profits” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.333).  Any damage to this reputa-
tion will have negative impacts on the corporation’s future profitability (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, 
p.333).  Therefore, threats to corporate legitimacy can cause damage to the value of a corporation’s 
reputation, which must be minimized through active management (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.334).   
3.3. Stakeholder Theory  
3.3.1. Similarity and Difference between Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory 
Deegan & Unerman (2011) states in their book Financial Accounting Theory that legitimacy theory 
and stakeholder theory should not be treated as two separate theories and they complement each oth-
er (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.348). As Deegan (2002, p. 295) indicates, stakeholder theory and 
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legitimacy theory have many similarities – “both theories conceptualize the organization as part of a 
broader social system wherein the organization impacts upon, and is impacted by, other groups with-
in society.” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p. 348)  
There are also differences between stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory. Deegan & Unerman 
(2011) point out that “legitimacy theory considers interactions with ‘society’ as a whole” and it “dis-
cusses the expectations of society in general (as encapsulated within the ‘social contract’)” (Deegan 
& Unerman, 2011, p.348-349). Stakeholder theory is “focusing on how an organization interacts 
with particular stakeholders” and it “provides a more refined resolution by referring to particular 
groups within society (stakeholder groups)” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.348-349).  
3.3.2. Stakeholder Concept 
Freeman & Reed (1983) proposed to understand the concept of stakeholder from two perspectives, a 
wide sense and a narrow sense, and they defined the stakeholder concept as:  
“The Wide Sense of Stakeholder: Any identifiable group or individual who can affect the achieve-
ment of an organization’s objectives or who is affected by the achievement of an organization’s ob-
jectives. (Public interest groups, protest groups, government agencies, trade associations, competi-
tors, unions, as well as employees, customer segments, shareowners and others are stakeholders, in 
this sense.)” (Freeman & Reed, 1983, p.91)   
“The Narrow Sense of Stakeholder: Any identifiable group or individual on which the organization is 
dependent for its continued survival. (Employees, customer segments, certain suppliers, key gov-
ernment agencies, shareowners, certain financial institutions, as well as others are all stakeholders in 
the narrow sense of the term.)” (Freeman & Reed, 1983, p.91) 
Freeman’s wide sense of stakeholder concept includes another two different stakeholder concepts – 
primary stakeholders and secondary stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995, p. 106). Primary stakeholders are 
those whose continuing participation is a matter of survival for the corporation; while secondary 
stakeholders are those who can influence or affect positively and negatively the corporation, or those 
who are influenced or affected by the corporation’s business operations. They do not take part in the 
transactions with corporation and they are not essential for a corporation’s survival (Clarkson, 1995, 
p.106-107). 
3.3.3. Normative and Positive Branch of Stakeholder Theory 
Based on the different interpretations about stakeholder concept, stakeholder theory can be broken 
into two branches – normative (ethical/moral) branch and positive (managerial) branch (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2011, p.348).  
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The Normative/Ethical Branch of Stakeholder Theory 
According to Deegan & Unerman (2011), stakeholder theory from moral perspective argues that “all 
stakeholders have the right to be treated fairly by an organization” and “the impact of the organiza-
tion on the life experiences of a stakeholder should be what determines the organization’s responsi-
bilities to that stakeholder, rather than the extent of that stakeholder’s (economic) power over the or-
ganization” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.349).  
Hasnas (1998) states in his paper The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for The Per-
plexed:  
“Managers should manage the business for the benefit of all stakeholders. It [stakeholder theory 
normative branch] views the firm not as a mechanism for increasing the stockholders’ financial re-
turns, but as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholder interests, and sees management as having a fidu-
ciary relationship not only to the stockholders, but to all stakeholders.” (Hasnas, 1998, p. 32) 
Deegan and Unerman argue that “stakeholders have intrinsic rights” and “these rights should not be 
violated” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.350). Both primary stakeholders and secondary stakeholders 
have their minimum rights, which can be interpreted as “the right[s] to be provided with information 
about how the organization is affecting them (perhaps through pollution, community sponsorship, 
provision of employment safety initiatives, etc.), even if they [stakeholders] choose not to use the 
information, and even if they cannot directly have an impact on the survival of the organization” 
(Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.350-351). 
Stakeholders’ rights to information, as per Gray et al.s (1996) “accountability model”, are reporting 
as a responsibility rather than demand driven (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.351). The role of corpo-
rate social responsibility report is to provide the society with information about whether or to which 
extent a corporation has met the responsibilities that are imposed upon it by the society (Deegan & 
Unerman, 2011, p.351). 
The Positive/managerial Branch of Stakeholder Theory  
The positive branch “explicitly considers various groups (of stakeholders) that exist in society, and 
how the expectations of particular stakeholder groups may have more (or less) impact on corporate 
strategies” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.349); and it considers also “how they [stakeholders] should 
best be managed if the organization is to survive” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.353).  
Stakeholder theory from the managerial perspective argues that an organization should not respond 
to all stakeholders equally, but should respond to the most powerful stakeholders. A stakeholder’s 
power is defined as “the extent that a stakeholder can exert its influence on the organization” (Dee-
29 
 
gan & Unerman, 2011, p. 354) or “the stakeholder’s degree of control over resources required by the 
organization” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.353). 
The role of management is to “asses the importance of meeting stakeholder demands in order to 
achieve the strategic objectives of the firm” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.354).  “The level of stake-
holder power increases, the importance of meeting stakeholder demands increases.” “Various activi-
ties undertaken by organizations, including public reporting, will be directly related to the expecta-
tions of particular stakeholder groups.” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.354) Thus the aim of infor-
mation disclosure is to inform respective stakeholder groups that organizations are “conforming with 
those stakeholders’ expectations” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.354).  Information becomes a major 
element employed by organizations to manage or manipulate their stakeholders, to gain their support 
or approval, to distract their opposition and disapproval as well (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.354-
355) 
Stakeholders have various conflicting interests and expectations. Empirical studies indicate that some 
corporations will choose to provide information to those most powerful stakeholders who are im-
portant to the survival of the organization (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.355). On the other hand, 
some other corporations will elect to be more ethical/morally aware. However, in most cases, there 
will be most likely a combination of both aspects (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.360).   
3.4. Fairness and Social Norms 
Hechter and Opp (2005) illustrated in their book Social Norms that there are no unified definition 
about social norms because researchers “disagree about what norms are” (Hechter & Opp, 2005, 
p.3). They pointed out that “several key elements are widely acknowledged as essential” for defining 
norms (Hechter & Opp, 2005, p.5). Based on those essential elements, they defined social norm as 
rules “that are enforced through social sanctions” and that specify what people should and should not 
do in certain social surroundings or under certain circumstances (Hechter & Opp, 2005, p.5). Norms 
are created and become “statistically expected and socially prescribed”, if “most people behave in 
certain ways” (Hechter & Opp, 2005, p.278).  
According to Hechter and Opp (2005), there are two types of norms: moral norms and coercive 
norms. They emphasize that “all norms might ultimately be moral norms” (Hechter & Opp, 2005, 
p.297).  
Moral norms “prescribe behavior that most people would do anyway or proscribes behavior that 
most people would not do anyway, even in the absence of such norms and the accompanying threat 
of sanctions” (Hechter & Opp, 2005, p.281). For example, norms against rape or murder belong to 
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the category of moral norms and people tend not to violate moral norms (Hechter & Opp, 2005, 
p.281).  
Coercive norm “prescribes behavior that most people would not otherwise do or proscribes behavior 
that most people would otherwise do, in the absence of such norms” (Hechter & Opp, 2005, p.281). 
Most of the specific coercive norms often have fairness as their moral ground (Hechter & Opp, 2005, 
p.297). For example, speeding and tax evasion are violations against coercive norms (Hechter & 
Opp, 2005, p.281) and fairness “necessitates the coercive norms of speed limits or tax contribution” 
(Hechter & Opp, 2005, p.297). 
According to Moral Foundations Theory, fairness is one of the five moral foundations (Care/harm, 
Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion and Sanctity/degradation) for social 
norms. Each culture builds up its virtues, narratives and institutions, and thereby its unique moralities 
based on those five moral foundations. Moral Foundations Theory aims at understanding the differ-
ences and similarities of morality under the cross-cultural circumstances. According to Jonathan 
Haidt (2012), fairness/cheating foundation refers to “profiting from someone else’s undeserved loss” 
(Haidt, 2012, Chapter 7, p.1).  
In the field of social dilemma research, fairness is regarded as a social norm which acts as “an im-
portant motive in social dilemmas” (Biel, Eek, Gärling & Gustafson, 2008, p.76). Social dilemmas 
refer to the situation when self-interest conflicts with collective interest.  Biel, et al. (2008) pointed 
out that fairness, as a strong societal norm, plays “a paramount role for how people behave in social 
dilemmas” (Biel, Eek, Gärling & Gustafson, 2008, p.76). It gives guidance to cooperation between 
individuals and “downplays the role of self-interest in social dilemmas” (Biel, Eek, Gärling & Gus-
tafson, 2008, p.76).  
Biel, et al. (2008) mentioned also that fairness is important for “self-presentational concerns. People 
are striving for maximizing their own gains. Simultaneously, they are trying to be seen as fair”, be-
cause fairness is considered to be a moral virtue (Biel, Eek, Gärling & Gustafson, 2008, p.76). 
Bicchieri (2006) examined social norms including fairness norm in his book The Grammar of Socie-
ty. She categorized fairness, together with reciprocity and trust, into the category of local norms, be-
cause “their interpretation and the expectations and prescriptions that surround them vary with the 
objects, people, and situations to which they apply” (Bicchieri, 2006, p.76). However, both reciproci-
ty and trust norms are partial and local in a stronger sense. By using rules against nepotism as an ex-
ample of avoiding “personalizing fairness”, she stated that fairness norms, in most societies, are con-
sidered as impartial, “in the sense that they are meant to apply to everyone who is in a given posi-
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tion” (Bicchieri, 2006, p.76). Moreover, she emphasized that “we ought to be fair in all of our inter-
actions” (Bicchieri, 2006, p.76). 
3.5. Tax Planning and Tax Haven 
3.5.1. Three forms of Tax Planning  
The tax planning industry is thriving and many international tax accountants and lawyers are helping 
various multinational corporations to minimize their global tax burden (Eden, 2011, p.14-15). 
Shifting profit to tax haven through transfer pricing manipulation is one of the golden tools for 
helping tax planning, which includes three forms: tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax fraud (Eden, 
2011, p. 15). Tax planning is perceived as compliant behavior when it is not concerned with the 
aggressive tax avoidance behavior that usually leads to tax evasion and tax fraud.  
Tax evasion refers to “the situation where a company tries to reduce tax liability by falsely 
suppressing income or inflating expenditure, recording fictitious transactions, etc” (IBE, 2013, p.1). 
Tax fraud is tax evasion by hiding relevant facts, creating nonexistent facts, or which is “covered  by 
a criminal provision in national tax law” (Eden, 2011, p. 16). 
3.5.2. Tax Haven 
Tax haven is a growing economic phenomenon and its growth rate is enormous. However, there are 
various definitions for tax haven. According to Assogbavi and Azondékon (2008), “the term ‘tax ha-
ven’ is not always easy to interpret, mainly because it has taken on so many different connotations” 
(Assogbavi & Azondékon, 2008, p.2). They quoted Colin Power’s (2002) description about tax ha-
ven in her book Tax Havens and Their Uses:  
“What … identifies an area as a tax haven is the existence of a composite tax structure established 
deliberately to take advantage of, and exploit, a worldwide demand for opportunities to engage in tax 
avoidance.”  (Assogbavi & Azondékon, 2008, p.2) 
Based on Powell’s description, Assogbavi and Azondékon gave their own definition of tax haven: “a 
country or territory where a wealthy individual either physically (having a local presence) or indi-
rectly (meaning that he oversees operations from his resident country), may establish a legal tax shel-
ter with advantages that extend further than those offered in his originating country. This individual 
may benefit by reducing his tax burden to benefit from a less tax-abrasive society by either self-
managing an account or by forming a trust.” (Assogbavi & Azondékon, 2008, p.2) 
Gravelle (2009) proposed two definitions for the concept of “tax haven” – a broad definition and a 
narrow definition. In a broad sense, tax haven is defined as “any low-tax country with a goal of at-
tracting capital, or simply any country that has low or non-existent taxes on capital income” (Grav-
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elle, 2009, p.729). On the other hand, a narrow definition limits tax haven concept to “ those coun-
tries that, in addition to having low or non-existent tax rates on some types of income, also are char-
acterized by a lack of transparency and information sharing, allow for bank secrecy, and require little 
or no economic activity for an entity to obtain legal status” (Gravelle, 2009, p.729). 
Report of Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in year 1998 defines 
tax haven as following: 
 “No or only nominal taxation combined with the fact that a country offers itself as a place, or 
is perceived to be a place, to be used by non-residents to escape tax in their country of resi-
dence may be sufficient to classify that jurisdiction as a tax haven.” (OECD, 1998, p.22) 
 “No or only nominal taxation combined with serious limitations on the ability of other coun-
tries to obtain information from that country for tax purposes would typically identify a tax 
haven.” (OECD, 1998, p.22) 
According to the definitions given above, OECD adopts the narrow definition of tax haven proposed 
by Gravelle.  
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated in its report to congressional re-
questers (2008) that “there is no agreed-upon definition of a tax haven or agreed-upon list of jurisdic-
tions that should be considered tax havens” (GAO, 2008, p.2). Based on various governmental, in-
ternational and academic sources, GAO defines the characteristics of tax haven as:  
“No or nominal taxes; a lack of effective exchange of information with foreign tax authorities; and a 
lack of transparency in legislative, legal, or administrative provisions.” (GAO, 2008, p.2)  
The report also pointed out that “offshore financial centers” and “financial privacy jurisdictions” 
have the similar characteristics as tax haven has. 
Generally speaking, within the context of this paper, tax haven is perceived to be a jurisdiction that 
creates attractive tax rules, systems of regulation and veils of secrecy in order to benefit non-resident 
individuals and companies (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.2).  
Similar to the concept of Tax Haven, there is not any unified list of tax havens. With a certain degree 
of subjectivity, different organizations or entities have their own criteria or interpretations of the Tax 
Haven concept (THG, 2014).  The following Table 1 shows a list of tax havens which are used in 
various studies of tax haven.  
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Table 1: Countries listed on Various Tax Haven Lists 
(Source: Gravelle, Jane G. (2009). Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion. pp. 729) 
 
According to the latest prominent OECD list of Tax Havens (2012), the last seven jurisdictions (An-
dorra, The Principality of Liechtenstein, Liberia, The Principality of Monaco, The Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, The Republic of Nauru and The Republic of Vanuatu) on the list of unco-operative 
tax havens have been excluded. Therefore, there are no countries currently listed as unco-operative 
tax havens (OECD, 2012). Instead, OECD coined a term “Other Financial Centers” which includes 
countries officially regarded as tax havens and other jurisdictions that have similar characteristics in 
tax incentives as tax havens have. Table 2 is a list of offshore financial centers (OFC) according to 
OECD (2012) (THG, 2014).  
 
Table 2: List of Offshore Financial Centers 
(Source: Tax Havens Guide. http://www.taxhavensguide.com/list-of-offshore-financial-centres.php) 
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In order to understand multinational corporations’ transfer pricing manipulation, we have already 
presented theories related to transfer pricing, stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory with a com-
plementary brief introduction of “fairness” social norm. The concept of tax planning and tax haven 
are also presented. In the next chapter, we are going to examine 1) the regulations about transfer 
pricing, especially OECD guidelines; 2) the practical mechanism of profit shifting via manipulating 
transfer pricing by presenting several cases; and  3) the attitudes of the general public towards tax 
avoidance behavior by showing the results of surveys and interviews. Afterwards, we will conduct 
the analysis from both theoretical perspective and practical perspective.  
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4. Global Regulations related to Transfer Pricing 
This part presents the global regulations related to transfer pricing, especially OECD’s work on 
transfer pricing. 
4.1. OECD Guidelines – OECD’s Work on Transfer Pricing 
The arm’s length principle dates all the way back to the first half of the century, when the League of 
Nation Model Tax Conventions formed the international consensus and in 1963 found its way into 
article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention. In 1980 it was adopted by the United Nations Model 
Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries. Today the arm's length 
principle is used in bilateral income tax treaties between OECD member countries as well as 
between OECD member countries and non OECD economies. It is currently part of the transfer 
pricing rules in over a hundred countries domestic legislation (Ruiter, 2012, p. 1).  
OECD has been continuously developing, revising and updating practical guidance for the 
implementation of the arm's length principle since the year 1979 via The OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations. The increasingly globalized 
economy creates huge challenges and in 2010 the guidelines were revised with a focus on 
comparability and profit methods. Among other things, this led to new guidance on transfer pricing 
aspects of business restructurings. During 2011, two new projects dealing with the transfer pricing of 
intangibles and the simplification of transfer pricing were launched by the OECD.  (Ruiter, 2012, 
p.2) 
Intangibles in connection to transfer pricing related matters such as transfer pricing aspects of 
business restructuring were considered to be a key area of concern to governments and taxpayers, 
because there is a lack of sufficient international guidance in particular on the definition, 
identification and valuation of intangibles for transfer pricing purposes.  (Ruiter, 2012, p. 2) 
The project concerning transfer pricing simplification was considered to be a high priority project 
and was aimed at streamlining the administration of the transfer pricing system in areas such as 
transfer pricing documentation and understandability of the guidelines themselves.  (Ruiter, 2012, p. 
2) 
OECD held its first annual meeting in March 2012. The meeting was about transfer pricing under the 
auspices of global forum on treaties and transfer pricing. This enabled government officials from 90 
countries to discuss transfer pricing issues (Ruiter, 2012, p. 3). 
OECDs Task Force on Tax and Development identified transfer pricing as one of its high-priority 
areas and aims to help developing countries introduce and implement transfer pricing rules by 
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providing support on policies issues for administrative structures, regulations and guidance and 
building practical auditing skills. Other aspects that will be looked over are availability of 
comparable data and access to financial data that is sometimes needed in order to apply transfer 
pricing rules. (Ruiter, 2012, p. 3-4) 
OECD, the European Commission and World Bank formed an international partnership in order to 
provide support. During May 2012 The Task Force on Tax and Development launched "Tax 
Inspectors without Borders" which is an initiative to help developing countries make their tax 
systems fairer and more effective. Plans were made by the OECD to establish an independent 
foundation to provide international auditing expertise and advice to help developing countries 
combat tax base erosion such as tax evasion as well as avoidance. (Ruiter, 2012, p. 4-5) 
Over 40 Commissioners or Heads of Taxation of OECD and non OECD economies make up 
OECD's Forum on Tax Administration. The aim of this forum is to produce outputs of significant 
relevance to developing countries and in 2012 the forum published the report "Dealing Effectively 
with the Challenges of Transfer Pricing" which focused on practical administration of transfer 
pricing programs. (Ruiter, 2012, p. 4-5) 
On November 12th to 14th, 2012, a conference took place.  During the conference, transfer pricing 
experts met more than 100 private sector representatives. OECD had a discussion related to 
Intangibles, Safe Harbors and Timing Issues. There was a discussion about how to improve the 
transfer pricing compliance and enforcement, and the implementation of targeted safe harbor 
provisions. According to Business Dictionary, safe harbor is a “provision in an agreement, law, or 
regulation that affords protection from liability or penalty under specified circumstances of if certain 
conditions are met” (Business Dictionary, 2014). Furthermore, the meeting focused on how to clear 
up the transfer pricing rules for transactions regarding intangibles and rules related to limiting the 
opportunities for applying the transfers of intangibles for tax advantage by attributing income to 
parties that only hold the legal title to the intangible, with the absence of economical contribution 
towards development and maintenance. (OECD, 2012)  
During 2013 new guidelines were introduced, concerning safe harbors in order to relieve some of the 
compliance burdens as well as to provide a greater certainty when involving smaller taxpayers and 
less complicated transactions, making developing countries able to make optimal use of the limited 
resources available. Some of the old guidelines concerning safe harbors were revised to better reflect 
the practices of OECD Member countries, as the way they are viewed have somewhat changed to a 
more positive view. Among some of the changes are bilateral agreements leading to safe harbors. A 
proposed draft recognizes that properly designed safe harbors can help relieve compliance burdens 
and provide taxpayers with greater certainty. (OECD, 2013)  
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OECD has historically placed a lot of focus on eliminating double taxation. The Model Tax 
Convention serves as a basis for over 3000 bilateral tax treaties.(OECD, 2014, webcast) Pascal Saint-
Amans, Director, OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration has stated during a 23 January 
2014 OECD webcast, that OECD might have been so effective in eliminating double taxation that 
they may have facilitated double non taxation. The recognition of double non taxation practices such 
as tax avoidance has led to OECD focusing on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) and 
publishing two reports: "Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting" in February 2013 and later in 
July "Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing". (OECD, forum, 2013) 
OECD is working together with the G20 countries on the BEPS project in order to develop rules to 
rehabilitate the global taxation system. (Saint-Amans, 2013) 
4.2. Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
The Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) is a plan for the actions that OECD 
wants to take in order to restrain base erosion and profit shifting. It also sets timelines for the imple-
mentation of the BEPS project (OECD, 2013). According to the action plan, the rules in the area of 
transfer pricing need to be revised with a larger emphasis on value creation in highly integrated 
groups, tackling the use of intangibles, risks, capital and other high-risk transactions to shift profits. 
(OECD, 2013, p.13) 
According OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, governments are deregulating 
the business environment and competing on offering lower tax in order to attract or retain economic 
activities. Such behaviors often take “the form of across the board corporate tax rate reductions on 
particular types of income (such as income from financial activities or from the provision of intangi-
bles)” (OECD, 2013, p.17). They can be harmful for the taxation in many countries, because they 
help drive the applicable tax rate on certain mobile sources of income to zero not only for countries 
that employ this type of taxation policies but also for those who do not. OECD plans to tackle these 
issues by putting more emphasis on transparency and substance in the regulations. (OECD, 2013, 
p.17) 
Action five "Counter harmful tax practices more effectively, taking into account transparency and 
substance” (OECD, 2013) in the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting states: 
“Revamp the work on harmful tax practices with a priority on improving transparency, including 
compulsory spontaneous exchange on rulings related to preferential regimes, and on requiring sub-
stantial activity for any preferential regime. It will take a holistic approach to evaluate preferential 
tax regimes in the BEPS context. It will engage with non OECD members on the basis of the existing 
framework and consider revisions or additions to the existing framework." (OECD, 2013, p. 18) 
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A major purpose of transfer pricing rules, the arm's length principle in particular, is to allocate multi-
national corporations’ profits in order to make them taxed in the countries where corporations con-
duct their business. In many cases, the transfer pricing rules based on the arm's length principle are 
able to achieve this aim effectively and efficiently. In other instances however, this might not always 
be the case. Multinational corporations are able to manipulate the rules to separate the income from 
the economic activities which generate the income by moving the income to low-tax jurisdictions 
such as tax havens. Some of the more common ways of doing so are: “transfers of intangibles and 
other mobile assets for less than full value, the over-capitalisation of lowly taxed group companies” 
and “contractual allocations of risk to low-tax environments in transactions that would be unlikely to 
occur between unrelated parties”, i.e. an uncontrolled transaction. (OECD, 2013, Action Plan on 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, OECD Publishing p19-20)  
OECD has recognized that the current regulatory systems need to be changed. However, due to the 
practical difficulties regarding the implementation and the importance of concerted action, the best 
course of action is to directly address the flaws regarding returns related to intangible assets, risk and 
over-capitalizations in the current transfer pricing system rather than replacing it with an entirely 
new system. To this end, special measures either within or beyond the arm's length principle may be 
required. (OECD, 2013, p. 20)  
Actions eight, nine and ten (OECD, 2013, p. 20-21) in the Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting state: 
"Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line with value creation" 
"Action 8 – Intangibles Develop rules to prevent BEPS by moving intangibles among group mem-
bers. This will involve: (i) adopting a broad and clearly delineated definition of intangibles; (ii) en-
suring that profits associated with the transfer and use of intangibles are appropriately allocated in 
accordance with (rather than divorced from) value creation; (iii) developing transfer pricing rules or 
special measures for transfers of hard-to-value intangibles; and (iv) updating the guidance on cost 
contribution arrangements." (OECD, 2013, p. 20) 
"Action 9 – Risks and capital Develop rules to prevent BEPS by transferring risks among, or allocat-
ing excessive capital to, group members. This will involve adopting transfer pricing rules or special 
measures to ensure that inappropriate returns will not accrue to an entity solely because it has con-
tractually assumed risks or has provided capital. The rules to be developed will also require align-
ment of returns with value creation. This work will be co-ordinated with the work on interest ex-
pense deductions and other financial payments." (OECD, 2013, p. 20) " 
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“Action 10 – Other high-risk transactions Develop rules to prevent BEPS by engaging in transactions 
which would not, or would only very rarely, occur between third parties. This will involve adopting 
transfer pricing rules or special measures to: (i) clarify the circumstances in which transactions can 
be recharacterised; (ii) clarify the application of transfer pricing methods, in particular profit splits, in 
the context of global value chains; and (iii) provide protection against common types of base eroding 
payments, such as management fees and head office expenses." (OECD, 2013, p.20-21) 
The above changes are set to take place during September 2014 and September 2015 (OECD, 2013, 
p.33). A starting point for the BEPS project is that OECD’s work needs to be inclusive and effective, 
which means that OECD’s work should “take into account perspective of developing countries and 
benefits from input of business and the civil society at large” (OECD, 2013, p.25). As a result, in 
light of the strong interest and support expressed by the G20 governments, even non OECD member 
countries of the G20 are invited to be part of the BEPS project as associates. Moreover, they will be 
on equal footing with OECD member countries, and thereby they “will expected to associate them-
selves with the outcome of the BEPS Project” (OECD, 2013, p.25). An important aim for the BEPS 
project is that it needs to be in line with the political expectations from most countries (OECD, 2013, 
p.26). However, consultations with non-governmental stakeholders are also of key importance. 
Therefore, business and civil society representatives are also invited to comment on different pro-
posals. (OECD, 2013, p.26) 
 
 
40 
 
5. Empirical Data 
This part describes multinational corporations’ tax avoidance mechanism via presentation of several 
cases. The general public’s attitudes towards corporations’ tax avoidance behavior in any form are 
also presented through various survey results. Our own survey and interviews with the major Swe-
dish media outlets are also presented here in order to reveal the fact – the lack of public concern on 
corporations’ tax planning behavior in the society.  
5.1. An Overview of Multinational Corporations’ Tax Avoidance Behavior 
Many multinational corporations operate successfully around the world. But they are paying little or 
even no local corporate tax at all. According to the 2011 ActionAid report (2011), the 100 biggest 
groups listed on the London Stock Exchange (FTSE 100) “comprise 34,216 subsidiary companies, 
joint ventures and associates”. “38% (8,492) of their overseas companies are located in tax havens.”  
98 of FTSE 100 companies use tax havens in order to reduce their corporate tax bills (ActionAid, 
2011, p.1).  
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), a non-ministerial department of the UK government 
which is responsible for the collection of taxes, estimated that during 2010 and 2011 the gap between 
the amount of actually collected corporation tax and the amount which should be collected is £4.1 
billion. Some researchers believe that this tax gap is as big as £12 billion (IBE, 2013, p.2). ActionAid 
(2011) mentioned in its report “Addicted to tax havens: The Secret Life of the FTSE 100” that the 
U.K. government could be losing as high as £18 billion a year to tax havens (ActionAid, 2011, p. 6). 
According to a U.S. Senate report (2009), “offshore tax abuses cost the U.S. Treasury an estimated $ 
100 billion each year in lost tax revenues, … Abusive domestic tax shelters cost tens of billions of 
dollars more.” The report also presents that more than 80 percent of the U.S. largest companies have 
offshore subsidiaries in tax havens (Levin, 2009). 
Multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior by taking advantage of tax haven “add[s] to the 
soaring budget deficit and shift[s] the tax burden to small businesses and families, who play by the 
rules”. Carl Levin, the U.S. Senator of Michigan, claims that “Offshore tax haven and tax shelter 
abuses are undermining the integrity of our tax system and increasing the tax burden on middle 
income families” (Levin, 2009). 
According to the Bloomberg journalist Jesse Drucker (2010), transfer pricing manipulation causes 
almost $60 billion dollars loss yearly for the U.S. Treasury. And it takes almost seven years for the 
U.S. government to generate $60 billion tax on certain financial institutions and this “lost revenue 
could pay the federal government’s share of health coverage for more than 10 million uninsured 
Americans” (Drucker, 2010). 
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Crisea and Nguyen (2013) conducted a study to prove, with new empirical evidence, multinational 
corporations’ profit shifting mechanism through transfer pricing manipulation. They use data for the 
period 1999 – 2006 from Denmark and find significant evidence that Danish multinational firms shift 
profits from high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions by using transfer pricing manipulation. 
They find that “a 10 percentage point decrease in the foreign tax rate below Denmark’s rate induces 
a MNC to lower its export price by 5.7 percent when selling to a market with established foreign 
ownership, relative to non-affiliated exporters” (Crisea & Nguyen, 2013, p. 4). 
Their research also points out that “the fall in the MNC’s export price is even larger when estimated 
on the subsample of firms who establish new affiliates during the sample period.” (Crisea & Nguyen, 
2013, p. 4) The result indicates “a 10 percent fall in the export prices of MNCs relative to non-
affiliated exporters” (Crisea & Nguyen, 2013, p.4).  These findings prove that Danish multinational 
corporations shift profit to low-tax jurisdiction by using low export prices in order to avoid taxation. 
Action Aid’s report (2011), Addicted to Tax Havens, claims that corporate tax avoidance is “one of 
the main reasons companies use tax havens” (ActionAid, 2011, p.1). Such a behavior has “a massive 
impact on developing and developed countries alike” (ActionAid, 2011, p.1). Yet, the developing 
countries suffered more from multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior, because such a 
behavior cuts off “the only sustainable source of funding for [developing countries’] governments to 
invest in reducing poverty and inequality” (ActionAid, 2011, p.1). “The OECD estimates that 
developing countries lose almost three times more to tax havens than all the aid they receive each 
year” (ActionAid, 2011, p.1). 
Ernst & Young 2013 Global Transfer Pricing Survey 
According to Ernst & Young’s 2013 global transfer pricing survey which is based on interviews with 
professionals at 878 corporations in 26 countries, “66% of companies identified ‘risk management’ 
as their highest priority for transfer pricing”. There is “a 32% increase over surveys conducted in 
2007 and 2010” (Ernst & Young, 2013, p.3). The results of the survey also show that “28 % of 
companies reported using the mutual agreement procedure; 26% of companies reported using the 
advance pricing agreement process (APA); 15% of companies reported having referred a case to 
litigation in the past year; 28% of companies report unresolved transfer pricing examinations; 60% 
of companies report having been subject to an interest charge when they had a transfer pricing 
adjustment; 24% report having been subject to penalties when they had a transfer pricing 
adjustment” (Ernst & Young, 2013, p.7). 
The growing concern for transfer pricing issues leads to increasing amount of work for supranational 
organizations. OECD has recently carried out a project on BEPS (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting) 
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which is focusing on harmonizing tax authorities’ approaches to eliminate inappropriate tax 
avoidance. In BEPS project report, some indicators show that “tax practices of some multinational 
companies have become more aggressive over time, raising serious compliance and fairness issues.” 
(Ernst & Young, 2013, p.6) Report points out that transfer pricing is “key pressure area”, especially 
when it comes to “the shifting of intangibles, the artificial splitting and ownership of assets between 
entities within a group, and transactions between such entities that would rarely take place between 
independents” (OECD, 2013, p.6). 
5.2. Cases of Tax Avoidance Through Transfer Pricing Manipulation 
The following cases are collected from companies’ web pages and other various sources, such as 
Fobes, Bloomberg, the Guardian, and Action Aid’s reports.  
5.2.1. Forest Laboratories Inc. Case – The Double Irish  
Forest Laboratories Inc., a pharmaceutical company, has its headquarters in New York City. The 
company is known for licensing European pharmaceuticals in order to sell those medicines in the 
United States. For example, Forest sells Lexapro, the world’s third bestselling antidepressant, in the 
United States. Since Lexapro’s debut in 2002, $13.8 billion revenue has been generated and 58 
percent of Forest’s sales were from Lexapro (Drucker, 2010). In 2009, Lexapro alone generated $2.3 
billion in revenue. But most of its profits are not taxed in the U.S. and company pays little tax 
elsewhere (Drucker, 2010). 
The profit from Lexapro makes a journey across the Atlantic Ocean first to Dublin, Ireland. Lexapro 
are produced and tested in the Forest subsidiary, Forest Laboratories Ireland Ltd. The Irish subsidy 
controls the patents of Lexapro for the U.S. market; while Forest licenses the use of patent from a 
Danish pharmaceutical company, H. Lundbeck A/S and the Irish subsidy pays for Lexapro’s U.S. 
clinical trials (Drucker, 2010). The Irish subsidiary sells Lexapro to the parent company in the U.S. 
The secondary processing, such as bottling and blister-packing, is carried out in the U.S. Each tablet 
the parent company buy helps shift profit to Ireland, where the corporate tax rate is between 10 
percent and 12.5 percent (Drucker, 2010). However, the corporate tax rate in the U.S. is 35 percent, 
which is one of the world’s highest tax rates on corporate income. In fiscal year 2009, the Irish 
subsidy reported $2.5 billion in sales which accounted for 70 percent of parent company’s net sales 
($3.6 billion) (Drucker, 2010). 
The profit from Lexapro does not stay in Ireland. Taking advice from Ernst & Young in 2005, the 
Irish subsidiary “Forest Laboratories Holdings Ltd” started reorganizing and registered a one-person 
law office in Hamilton, Bermuda which has no corporate tax (Drucker, 2010). This law office is 
claimed to be the corporation’s tax residence and then controls licensing of the patents. A second 
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subsidiary in Ireland was established to deal with the manufacturing and sublicensing the rights to 
the patents (Drucker, 2010). This arrangement helped the Irish subsidiary reduce its effective tax rate 
from 10.3 percent to 2.4 percent, because the license fees which went to Bermuda were deducted 
from the corporation’s taxable income (Drucker, 2010). Those license fees did not need to pay any 
corporate income tax in Bermuda. This type of structure has a special name: the Double Irish 
(Drucker, 2010). 
In order to avoid another Irish tax, the profit from Lexapro did not go directly to Bermuda. Before it 
finally flied to Bermuda, it stayed in Amsterdam temporarily via passing through another subsidiary 
(Forest Finance BV in the Netherlands) where Forest has no employees. Forest’s annual report in 
2007 presented that Forest Finance paid out 99.6 percent of its $1.19 billion licensing income as 
licensing expense (Drucker, 2010). According to Richard Murphy, the director of Tax Research 
LLP, this route helped Forest bypass a 20 percent tax in Ireland on certain royalties for patents by 
taking advantage of “an exemption from the levy if payments go to a company in another EU 
member state” (Drucker, 2010). 
This Irish-Dutch-Bermudan international operation doubled Forest’s income tax saving. In 2007, the 
company’s effective tax rate was reduced by 21.8 percent. By using transfer pricing manipulation, 
Forest saved more than one third of its tax payments in 2009, which accounted for $183 million. As 
a result, Forest’s net income was boosted by 31 percent in 2009. (Drucker, 2010)   
Current Financial Performance 
Table 3 presents selected financial data of Forest Laboratories, Inc. from 2009 to 2013. There were 
continuous increases in corporation’s net sales during four years from 2009 to 2012 (4% in 2009, 7% 
in 2010, 8% in 2011 and 4.3% in 2012). The corporation’s most significant product, Lexapro, 
achieved a sale of $2,315,880 in fiscal 2011, which indicated an increase of $45,527 compared with 
the sales in fiscal 2010 (Forest Laboratories, Inc., 2011, p.13).  
In fiscal 2013, the corporation’s net sales decreased 33.9 percent and Lexapro also met its waterloo 
with a significant decrease of 90.9 percent in net sales (see Table 3 & 4 below) (Forest Laboratories, 
Inc., 2013, p.12). The 2013 Annual Report blames the sharp decline of the corporation’s net sales to 
the dramatic decrease in Lexapro sales, which, as per the 2013 Annual report, is the result of “the 
expiration of its [Lexapro’s] market exclusivity in March 2012” (Forest Laboratories, Inc., 2013, 
p.12). The report also points out that “excluding Lexapro sales, net sales increased $448.1 million or 
19.8% for fiscal 2013 compared to fiscal 2012” (Forest Laboratories, Inc., 2013, p.12). 
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Table 3: Forest Laboratories, Inc. Selected Financial Data (2009-2013) 
(Source: Forest Laboratories, Inc. (2013). 2013 Annual Report – Financial Data. P.1) 
 
 
Table 4: Net Sales of Key Products of Forest Laboratories, Inc. 
(Source: Forest Laboratories, Inc. (2013). 2013 Annual Report. P.12) 
5.2.2. Apple Case  
By using transfer pricing manipulation, Apple successfully cuts its U.S. corporate tax by an average 
of $10 billion yearly for four years. We all know that almost all the value of Apple’s products is in 
its patents and other intellectual properties. Apple minimizes the U.S. mother company’s intellectual 
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property income by charging little to its foreign affiliates for using the intellectual property. This 
helps Apple shift the profit to its foreign subsidiaries by maximizing their profits (Gleckman, 2013). 
Apple has two firms in Ireland and they are the core of Apple’s tax arrangements. These two firms 
helped Apple funnel two-thirds of its pre-tax global income (Gleckman, 2013). In 2011, Apple 
generated $34 billion in pre-tax income in total, of which $22 billion was shifted to these two firms 
in Ireland. However, these incomes did not return to Apple. It disappeared into the deep blue. That is, 
the “ocean income” as Harvard University tax professor Steve Shay says (Gleckman, 2013). 
According to Australian Financial Review, Apple has moved $8.9 billion in profits from Australia to 
Ireland in the past 10 years (Farrell, 2014). In 2013, Apple Sales International in Ireland was 
reported to help Apple shift $2 billion income from Australia to Ireland and Apple only reported 
$88.5 million in pre-tax earnings in Australia (Farrell, 2014). 
Current Financial Performance 
Table 5 presents the three-year (2011-2013) financial history of Apple Inc. As per the data in table 4, 
both domestic and international net sales of Apple are increasing continuously every year. Domestic 
and international net sales in financial year 2012, compared with 2011, have increased 45.77 percent 
and 43.83 percent respectively. The increase of net sales in financial year 2013 is 8.61 percent for 
domestic and 9.53 percent for international, compared with sales in 2012.  The yearly increase of 
total net sales is 44.58 percent for 2012 and 9.20 percent for 2013.  
 
Table 5: Apple Three-Year Financial History 
(Source: Apple Website (http://investor.apple.com/financials.cfm). (2014). Apple Three-year 
Financial History. p.1) 
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 2014 Q 2 2014 Q 1 2014 Q 2 2013 Q 1 
Quarterly Revenue $45.6 $57.6 $43.6 $54.5 
Quarterly Net Profit $10.2 $13.1 $9.5 $13.1 
Table 6: Apple Quarterly Reports 
(Source: Apple Website (http://investor.apple.com/results.cfm). (2014). Earnings Releases.) 
 
According to Apple’s first quarter 2014 (ended December 28, 2013) report, record quarterly revenue 
was $57.6 billion, which is an increase of 5.69 percent compared to the same quarter the previous 
year at $54.5 billion (Apple, 2014). Quarterly net profit is $13.1 billion (Apple, 2014). International 
sales account for 63 percent of the quarter’s revenue (Apple, 2014). Both iPhones (51 million) and 
iPads (47.8 million) sales during the first quarter 2014 created the all-time quarterly records (Apple, 
2014). 
Apple’s second quarter 2014 (ended March 29, 2014) report shows quarterly revenue of $45.6 billion 
and net profit of $10.2 billion (Apple, 2014). Compared to the year-ago quarter ($43.6 billion in 
revenue and $9.5 billion in net profit), both revenue and net profit are increasing (Apple, 2014). The 
increases are 4.59 percent for quarterly revenue and 7.37 percent for net profit. International sales in 
the second quarter account for 66 percent of the quarter’s revenue, which increased by 3 percent 
compared to the previous quarter in 2014 (Apple, 2014).   
5.2.3. Caterpillar Case 
Caterpillar Inc. is one of the world’s largest manufacturing companies which designs, manufactures, 
markets and sells machinery and engines. It is reported that the company moved more than $8 billion 
in profits to Switzerland for the reason of tax avoidance (Roberts, 2014). 
The majority of Caterpillar’s manufacturing, R&D and employment are in the U.S. The company’s 
most profitable business is the international spare parts business. There are 54 manufacturing 
facilities, 10 warehouses and 4900 parts employees in the U.S. Caterpillar company which ships 
around 1.5 billion parts around the world. The Company has also an offshore subsidiary in 
Switzerland which has only 65 staff members and has no parts manufacturing or warehouses. The 
Swiss subsidiary is established only for the tax avoidance purpose, according to a senior tax official 
who works for the company.  It is reported that 85 percent of profit from the international spare parts 
business were routed through Caterpillar’s Swiss subsidiary (Roberts, 2014). By making a deal with 
Swiss tax authorities, the company succeeded in avoiding paying more than $2.4 billion in U.S. tax 
over a decade. And Caterpillar’s Geneva-based subsidiary only paid 4% tax on the profits of 
international spare parts sales (Roberts, 2014). 
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Caterpillar is accused of employing aggressive transfer pricing manipulation in order to avoid tax on 
purpose, since the company’s parts business is mostly based in a high-tax jurisdictions instead of at 
its offshore Swiss subsidiary  (Roberts, 2014). 
5.2.4. SABMiller Case  
SABMiller is one of the FTSE 100 corporations and it is the world’s second-biggest brewer and one 
of the world’s biggest bottlers of Coca-Cola products. SABMiller has more than 200 beer brands and 
over 70,000 employees in 75 countries around the world. The headquarters of the company is 
situated in London, United Kingdom. (SABMiller, 2014) 
SABMiller has been involved in many tax affairs in the developing world. One example is the 
corporation’s tax dispute case in Delhi High Court, India. SABMiller is accused of evading tax when 
buying intangible assets (Forster’s brand name and patent in the Indian branch) from Forster’s 
Australia, one of SABMiller’s subsidiaries (Padmakshan, 2009). In 2011, SABMiller was sentenced 
to pay tax on the deal of purchasing the Indian assets from Foster’s. According to the report “Calling 
Time – Why SABMiller Should Stop Dodging Taxes in Africa” conducted by ActionAid, there are 
more than 10,000 people around the world taking actions to urge SABMiller to take responsible 
measures to deal with these tax affairs (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.4).  
Accra Brewery, SABMiller’s subsidiary in Ghana, Africa, is the second-largest brewer in Ghana. 
Hearson and Brooks (2012) described in their report that company generated £29 million of beer 
yearly but it recorded a loss in the past two years. Moreover, company “paid corporation tax in only 
one of the four years from 2007-10”. A small retailer of SABMiller’s Club beer in Ghana with £220 
in profit monthly paid more income tax than its supplier, SABMiller’s subsidiary in Ghana, during 
the past two years (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.7). 
The Action Aid’s report presented four ways SABMiller used to avoid tax. Among these four tax 
dodging strategies, two of them are too new to find solid data to show the tax lost for the African 
countries. The other two strategies – going Dutch and the Swiss Role – are presenting a huge tax loss 
to African countries (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.7-8).  
Going Dutch 
SABMiller has a subsidiary in the Netherlands which is in charge of the company’s local beer brands 
sold in African countries where the beer is produced.  The subsidiary in the Netherlands “takes 
advantage of a novel set of tax rules offered by the Netherlands that enables companies to pay next to 
no tax on the royalties they earn” (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.8). According to the Action Aid 
report, SABMiller’s African subsidiaries paid £25 million in royalties in  2011 and this directly led 
to “an estimated tax loss to African countries of £10 million” (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.8). 
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The Swiss Role 
The Action Aid’s report revealed that “SABMiller’s African and Indian subsidiaries pay whopping 
‘management service fees’ to sister companies in European tax havens where effective tax rates are 
lower, mostly to Switzerland” (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.8). Hearson and Brooks (2012) quoted 
the words from the head of the Ghana Revenue Authority in their report, “management fees is an 
area that we know is being used widely [to avoid tax], and it’s mainly because it’s difficult to verify 
the reasonableness of the management fee” (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.8). It is estimated that 
SABMiller’s African and Indian subsidiaries pay £47 million in management fees yearly and this 
helps SABMiller successfully dodge £9.5 million in tax payment (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.8).   
Current Financial Performance 
During the tax dispute period (from 2009 to 2011), SABMiller’s financial performance was not 
affected at all. Its group revenue and EBITA (earnings before interest, tax, amortization and 
exceptional items) continued to increase. According to SABMiller’s Annual Report 2009, 2010 and 
2011, corporation’s group revenue growth was 9%, 4% and 7%; corporation’s EBITA growth was 
5%, 6% and 15% (SABMiller, 2009, p.1; 2010, p. 1; 2011, p.1). 
According to SABMiller plc Annual Report 2012, the corporation’s “reported EBITA grew 12%, 
with organic, constant currency EBITA growth of 8%; EBITA margin increased by 10 basis points 
(bps) to 17.9%” (SABMiller, 2012, p.7). Except for a slight EBITA decline in the European market, 
strong EBITA increases dominated all the other markets, among which Asia Pacific had the highest 
EBITA increase with 30%. The African market had an EBITA growth of 16% and the other two 
markets, Latin America and South Africa, both had 14% in EBITA growth (SABMiller, 2012, p.7). 
North America EBITA increased by 2% (SABMiller, 2012, p.7). 
SABMiller plc Annual Report 2013 shows a “reported group revenue growth of 10%” with organic, 
constant currency group revenue growth of 7% (SABMiller, 2013, p.38). EBITA had an increase of 
14% with 9% on an organic, constant currency basis and EBITA margin increased by 70 basis points 
(bps) to 18.6%, compared with the previous year (SABMiller, 2013, p.38). The adjusted profit before 
tax had an increase of 11 percent (SABMiller, 2013, p.38). 
5.3. Public Attitudes to Tax Avoidance in Any Form 
5.3.1. World Value Survey 2005-2006 
World Value Survey (WVS) is a global survey of socio-cultural and political change. The latest 
survey, WVS 2005/2007, collected data from 57 countries, including most of the OECD countries 
(WVS, 2011). The national sample each involves more than 1000 individuals. “The World Values 
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Surveys have produced comparative data on what people value, what their beliefs are, what they 
want out of life and the facts of life.” (Tekeli, 2011, p.8) 
In the questionnaire of WVS 2005, question number 200 is about the general public’s attitudes 
towards cheating on taxation. Similar question has been surveyed altogether four times during two 
decades (from 1981 to 2005). The question in the latest survey is:  
“Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never 
be justified, or something in between, using this card.” 
 Never 
justifiable 
        Always 
justifiable 
V200. Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Table 7: Question 200 in the questionnaire of WVS 2005  
(Source: WVS 2005-2006 Wave, OECD-Split Version – Ballot A) 
As shown above, the attitude to cheating on taxes is measured with a one to ten scales. A one 
represents that cheating on taxes is never justifiable; a 10 indicates that cheating on taxes is always 
justifiable. Many researchers use the data from this survey to analyze how views change over time 
globally. Tekeli (2011) tried to “link the tax morale and high degree of tax compliance” (Tekeli, 
2011, p.2) and to find out the determinants of tax morale based on the data from the question listed 
above.  According to his study, the attitude of individual in OECD countries towards cheating on 
taxes is shown in Figure 1. On average 62.6 percent of individuals in OECD countries agreed that 
“tax cheating is never justifiable.  
Figure 1: Tax Morale in OECD Countries 
Note: Data for public attitudes to tax cheating was not available for all OECD countries. (Source: Tekeli (2011). 
The Determinants of Tax Morale: the Effects of Cultural Differences and Politics. Page 12-13) 
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5.3.2. ComRes Tax Avoidance Survey and IBE Business Ethics Survey 
From February 15 to February 17, 2013, Christian Aid (ComRes) conducted a survey about the 
public attitudes to tax avoidance which was based on an online interview with 2,270 adults in the 
U.K.  According to this tax avoidance survey, public anger on tax avoidance increased in 2012 and 
80 percent of Britons felt anger over multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior. The survey 
also showed that one third of the Britons are boycotting companies that avoid tax in the 
U.K.(ComRes, 2013).  Another survey conducted by ActionAid showed that 72 percent of Britons 
agreed that “companies should pay their full share of tax, and it is not acceptable for them to use 
loopholes in the law to avoid paying their share” (ActionAid, 2012). 
An IBE briefing “Tax Avoidance as an Ethical Issue for Business” (2013) concluded based on 
Christian Aid’s tax avoidance survey that 75 percent of respondents of the survey think that the 
British government has “a responsibility to ensure that all UK-based companies pay the proper 
amount of tax in every country in which they operate”. 85 percent respondents of the survey claim 
that “it was ‘too easy’ for multinational companies in the U.K. to avoid paying tax” (IBE, 2013, p.2).  
5.3.3. Survey and Interview About Multinational Corporations’ Tax Planning  
Survey about Multinational Corporations’ Tax Planning 
As mentioned earlier in 2.2.2. Data Collection and Processing, survey was conducted in a form of 
conversation with 50 randomly selected people, among whom there are 25 Swedish citizens from a 
typical Swedish community and 25 students from Lund University. 88 percent of respondents (44 
respondents out of 50) claimed that tax planning is their least concern or is the least interesting topic 
compared with the other three alternatives. 60 percent of correspondents (30 respondents out of 50) 
chose to rank the issues as 1) Environmental Problem; 2) Child Labor; 3) Low Salary; and 4) Tax 
Planning. The detailed ranking information about the top issue on the list is presented in the 
following Table 8.  
The Top Issue on the List 
25 normal Swedish 
Citizens 
25 students from 
Lund University 
Total Percentage 
a) Environmental Problem 18 12 30 60% 
b) Low Salary 2 1 3 6% 
c) Child Labor 5 6 11 22% 
d) Tax Planning 0 6 6 12% 
Table 8: Result of Survey: Issue positioned at the Top of the List 
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All the respondents in the community rank tax planning last on the list and their reasons for such a 
ranking are unanimous: there is a lack of media publicity about multinational corporations’ tax 
planning behavior. As for the students, depending on different academic backgrounds, they have 
certain biases towards different issues. Four students from Business Administration and two students 
from Economics, for example, regarded tax planning as the most interesting topic. Other students all 
ranked tax planning last on the list due to a lack of publicity. Furthermore, they claimed that tax 
planning was simply not as close to the heart as the other subjects were, especially compared to child 
labor and environmental issues.  
Interviews with Media 
With the aim of finding out why there is so little media publicity about tax planning, we conducted 
interviews with seven major Swedish media companies. The interview questions are listed in 2.2.2. 
Data Collection and Processing. Answers to the questions are various and some of the answers relat-
ed to issues other than tax planning are not of interest to us, since our focus is tax planning. The re-
sult shows that most Swedish media placed tax planning at the bottom of the list. It should, however, 
be noted that no one said tax planning was uninteresting, but it was considered to be a bad choice for 
news reporting. The relevant information from the interviews is summarized as follows: 
 Relevance to the Readers / Viewers 
Relevance is something mentioned by all of our interviewees. Newspapers and news stations want to 
report issues in the society that their target audiences care so much about that they would like to do 
something about them. The problem with news reports about tax planning is that it doesn't touch the 
emotions of the target audience as much as other subjects, such as child labor. Another problem is 
that it does not affect the audience directly. If a company in Sweden is using transfer pricing strategy 
to shift profits to the tax haven in order to avoid corporation tax in Sweden, the general public is on-
ly indirectly affected by such a behavior. News about tax planning simply doesn't evoke the same 
strong emotion as other subjects (e.g. environment problems or child labor) do. After all, people 
would probably think: "It's only the government’s money; it's not ours! The government would just 
waste it anyway”. 
Needs of Being Actual News 
The word “new” is not part of the word “news” due to coincidence. One of the important points 
mentioned by both TV stations and two newspapers (Metro and Dagens Nyheter) is that news need 
to be something that is previously unknown or uncovered. There is, after all, little point to report 
about things that everyone already knows about. Tax planning and tax avoidance via various meth-
ods, such as transfer pricing manipulation, has been going on for a long time. It is no longer some-
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thing that could be considered "news". If the media is to report about it, they need to find a new an-
gle to report it, i.e. an angle to make it more appealing to the public. 
Could Be Too Complicated 
All five newspapers pointed out that tax planning and tax avoidance can be so complicated that it is 
hard for the general public to understand. Both TV stations mentioned that tax planning, besides be-
ing kind of “old news”, is so complicated that it will take up too much air time in the news for a 
thorough report. Moreover, journalists themselves sometimes are not experts in this field, either. 
This means that it is troublesome for journalists to report about tax planning, if they want to have 
some depth in their reports. These two factors lead to tax planning generally not being considered as 
the best choice for news, because neither the general public nor the journalists have enough 
knowledge to be able to make proper judgment. 
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6. Analysis 
Based on the literature overview and empirical data, this part presents the analysis of transfer pric-
ing manipulation by answering the questions: 1) What are the motives for multinational corporations 
to engage in transfer pricing manipulation? 2) Will tax avoidance behavior via manipulating trans-
fer pricing eventually lead to legitimacy problem for multinational corporations? 
6.1. Internal and external motivates for transfer pricing manipulation 
The trend of the business has long been internalization, which is one of the advantages for a 
multinational corporation over a domestic company (Eden, 2011, p. 7). The benefits from 
internalization, such as reduced transaction costs and free mobility of tacit resources, provide the 
ground for intra-firm trade (Eden, 2011, p. 7-8). Multinational corporations can have both internal 
and external motives to manipulate transfer pricing in the intra-firm trade. Corporations’ profit 
maximization goal characterizes the internal motive for transfer pricing manipulation and tax-
induced motives explain their external motives. 
Internal motive – profit maximization goal 
Multinational corporations mostly have decentralized organizational structure based on profit centers 
which have strengthened profit consciousness. For example, the foreign subsidiaries of four 
multinational corporations (Forest Laboratories Inc., Apple, Caterpillar Inc., and SABMiller) 
presented in the empirical data are considered to be profit centers which generate profits or costs 
separately via transfer pricing in the transactions within  the corporation. The goal for each 
subsidiary is obviously maximizing its own profit.  From the perspective of the whole corporation, 
the optimal goal has always been maximizing the corporation’s profit.  
As an effective tool for internal management control, a corporation’s transfer pricing strategy has an 
important objective – to induce goal congruent decisions, i.e. the profit maximization goal of each 
profit center should be consistent with the whole corporation’s profit maximization goal. Empirical 
data shows that four multinational corporations managed to maximize the whole corporation’s profits 
by maximizing their subsidiaries’ individual profits in the intra-firm trade.  It is done through shifting 
the corporations’ pre-tax income to their offshore subsidiaries in tax havens via manipulating transfer 
pricing, which minimizes the corporations’ tax costs.   
According to stakeholder theory managerial branch, the role of management is to meet the most 
powerful stakeholders’ demands in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the corporation. 
Maximizing stakeholders’ profits is the “one best way” to serve their interests. It is thus reasonable 
for those four corporations to maximize their profits by minimizing their tax cost via transfer pricing 
manipulation. 
54 
 
The primary norm of transfer pricing – the arm’s length principle – indicates that intra-firm trade 
should be conducted just like the transactions between unrelated partners on the open active market. 
The relation between unrelated trading partners is competitive, because their goals are maximizing 
their individual profits. However, in intra-firm trade, trade partners are related and their goals are 
consistent and cooperative – maximizing the whole corporation’s profit. The individual profit 
maximization goal of the “arm’s length principle” conflicts the cooperative goal of intra-firm trade. 
Therefore, multinational corporations have strong incentives to manipulate transfer pricing and 
deviate from the prominent transfer pricing norm.   
External Motives – tax-induced motives 
It is a universal truth that globalization makes it easier to exchange capital, goods and services across 
international borders or territories. Ghemawat (2003) pointed out that we are “in a state of 
semiglobalization” and we will “stay there for the next few decades” (Ghemawat, 2003, p.5-6). 
Semi-globalization indicates that there are still many big differences between countries, for example, 
differences in price and resources and differences in law and regulations.  
Beneficial tax regulations for the purpose of attracting foreign direct investments and tax haven are 
such economic phenomena under the circumstances of semi-globalization. Beneficial tax regulations 
induce tax differences which make regulatory arbitrage possible. Low or zero tax rates and a veil of 
secrecy for transactions via tax havens provide strong incentives for multinational corporations to 
shift their profits by manipulating transfer pricing in order to avoid corporate income tax, which is 
probably the most important motivation for corporations’ profit shifting behavior.  
The four cases presented in the empirical data share the same characteristic: tax planning via 
regulatory arbitrage, especially via shifting profits between high- and low- tax jurisdictions by using 
transfer pricing strategies and by taking advantage of the different tax regulations. Four corporations 
mentioned in the cases all established offshore subsidiaries in “Tax Haven” countries or “Offshore 
Financial Centers” (OFC) (Forest Laboratories Inc.’s Irish subsidiary and law office in Bermuda; 
Apple’s Irish subsidiaries; Caterpillar Inc.’s Swiss subsidiary; SABMiller’s subsidiaries in 
Netherlands and Switzerland). Those offshore subsidiaries are either claimed to be the corporations’ 
tax residence (e.g. Forest’s law office in Bermuda and Caterpillar’s Swiss subsidiary) or in charge of 
the intangible assets (e.g. Forest’s Irish subsidy, Apple’s Irish firms, and SABMiller’s subsidiary in 
Netherlands), such as trademarks, patents and other intellectual properties. Moreover, some 
subsidiaries provide management services (e.g. SABMiller’s subsidiary in Switzerland) and charge 
management fees to sister companies. In order to avoid or evade corporate taxation, four 
multinational corporations (Forest Laboratories Inc., Apple, Caterpillar Inc., and SABMiller) 
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successfully shifted their pre-tax global income through their offshore subsidiaries by maximizing 
those foreign subsidiaries’ profits either through patents’ licensing fees or management fees.    
Another external factor which makes the transfer pricing manipulation possible is the disadvantage 
of the arm’s length principle, when it comes to pricing intangible assets such as patents and other 
intellectual properties. One reason is that the arm’s length principle has an inherent problem: finding 
comparable intangible assets when the transaction involves intangible assets such as patents or 
trademarks. That is to say, how to distinguish the value of the trademark from the value of the 
product or service. Calculating a transfer price based on the arm's length principle by using for 
example the CUP method means to set a price as if it was between independent contractors. However, 
setting an appropriate price for an intangible asset is difficult because, for example, no trademarks in 
the world are at the same value; and how should people value patents. This is therefore problematic. 
The disadvantages of the arm's length principle make it possible for corporations to shift profits to 
tax havens by mispricing the intangibles during the transaction. OECD has acknowledged that, today, 
the arm's length principle by itself might not be enough and further revisions of the regulations need 
to be done. For example, regulations related to definition of intangibles, regulations concerning the 
allocation of the profits from intangibles not being divorced from the value creation of the assets, 
regulations about developing special measures for hard-to-value intangibles and regulations 
involving cost contribution arrangements. But for now, the inherent disadvantage of the arm’s length 
principle still exists with regard to the current regulations. And this is an important external factor for 
corporations’ motivation to engage in transfer pricing manipulation for tax purposes.  
6.2. Tax Induced Transfer Pricing Manipulation and Legitimacy Problem 
Multinational corporations under globalization “can benefit from integration and arbitrage in ways 
that domestic firms cannot” (Eden & Smith, 2011, p.8). As per our analysis above, they have both 
internal and external motivations to manipulate transfer pricing for the purpose of tax avoidance. 
Governments and authorities have long been aware of and are on full alert for the negative effects of 
multinational corporations’ inherent behavior of arbitraging international tax burdens via transfer 
pricing strategies. 
6.2.1. The Negative Effects of Tax Avoidance  
Among three forms of tax planning, tax evasion and tax fraud are fundamentally illegal, while tax 
avoidance lies in a grey area. It is a sort of legitimate form of tax planning which uses loopholes in 
laws and regulations for avoiding taxes. Moreover, there is a fine line between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion. 
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No matter which form of tax planning multinational corporations are using, their tax payments are 
minimized, which causes a huge cut on the government’s tax revenue. As the finance minister of 
South Africa stated, “aggressive tax avoidance” is “a serious cancer” which is “eating into the fiscal 
base of many countries” (Hearson & Brooks, 2012, p.6). 
Governments of developed countries are losing billions of dollars annually in tax revenue because of 
multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing manipulation. According to 
OECD estimation, “developing countries lose almost three times more to tax havens than all the aid 
they receive each year” (ActionAid, 2011, p.1). Very aggressive tax schemes aiming at dodging tax 
in developing countries, such as in SABMiller case, bring even more serious issues. Empirical 
evidences also show that developing countries suffered more from multinational corporations’ tax 
avoidance behavior via shifting profit out of those developing countries. 
Even if tax avoidance is not illegal, it brings the same or even more severe negative impacts on the 
society. It leads to welfare loss to the society and it discourages other tax compliant firms and 
individuals. 
6.2.2. Tax Avoidance Behavior and Social Contract 
According to legitimacy theory, the social contract includes both explicit and implicit terms. Explicit 
terms usually refer to laws and regulations; while implicit terms are related to social norms and non-
legislated societal expectations. Tax evasion and tax fraud via aggressive transfer pricing 
manipulation are against the laws and regulations of transfer pricing. Such behaviours will receive 
sanctions according to law and regulations and thereby are violations of the explicit terms in the 
social contract. However, multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior is not illegal, which 
means it does not breach the explicit terms of the social contract. But, does tax avoidance behavior 
breach the implicit terms of the social contract?  
Fairness is conceived by many philosophical researches as either the moral foundation for social 
norms or a strong societal norm. Moral Foundations Theory defines fairness as “profiting from 
someone else’s undeserved loss” (Haidt, 2012, Chapter7, p.1). Hechter & Opp (2005) pointed out 
clearly that fairness “necessitates the coercive norms of speed limits or tax contribution” (Hechter & 
Opp, 2005, p.297). Therefore, multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior is against fairness, 
which indicates that such a behavior is a violation of the implicit terms in the social contract and 
thereby is a breach of the social contract. 
Tax Avoidance and Fairness 
Every country is facing public spending obligations and constraints such as financing public 
infrastructure, national defence, education, health care, social security, and other public services. 
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Expenses on those essential goods and services in various aspects are majorly financed by the 
government’s tax revenue. Tax avoidance behavior of the four corporations mentioned in empirical 
data diverts resources used for these public spending obligations to the hands of a few individuals. In 
the long run, the welfare loss caused by their tax avoidance behavior would suffocate the hosting 
country’s economic development. 
When Caterpillar establishes a subsidiary in a tax haven – Switzerland only for the purpose of tax 
avoidance, while the majority of its key business activities are remaining in the high-tax jurisdiction 
– the U.S. as the home country with 35% corporate tax rate, Caterpillar becomes a “free rider” who 
enjoys the benefits from the public spending in the home country without contributing to financing it.  
On the other hand, governments of tax haven countries like Switzerland in the Caterpillar case can be 
regarded as “free riders” as well, since they are benefiting from consuming other countries’ (e.g. the 
U.S. in Caterpillar case) resources without paying for them.  It is not fair to consume one country’s 
resources while avoiding contributing to the national development of that country. It is not fair either 
when benefiting from consuming other countries’ resources without payments. 
For the developing world, multinational corporations’ profit shifting behavior through transfer 
pricing manipulation (e.g. in SABMiller case) has caused huge losses which those poor countries’ 
governments can hardly afford. Developing countries like Ghana in Africa are trying very hard in 
order to develop the national economy and improving their tax systems in order to generate 
additional revenues for the national development. However, SABMiller’s profit shifting behavior 
undermines such efforts from Ghana’s government. According to Action Aid’s report (2011), the tax 
payment that SABMiller avoid in Africa can afford to educate more than 250, 000 African children 
(ActionAid, 2011, p.6). Tax avoidance behavior of multinational corporations like SABMiller in 
developing countries can be compared to an action of exploitation under the new circumstances. It is 
obviously unfair and immoral.   
Moreover, multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior is not fair to those who are voluntarily 
paying their fair share of tax strictly complying with the spirit of law. As the U.S. senator Carl Levin 
(2009) pointed out that tax avoidance behavior redistributes the tax burden, because the compliant 
taxpayer will eventually bear the whole tax burden. Just as Carl Levin (2009) emphasized in his 
report, the unfair distribution of tax burden will discourage the compliant tax paying behavior and 
will make compliant taxpayers distrust the tax system. In order to compete favorably in the market, 
tax compliant corporations will most probably choose to engage in the tax avoidance schemes as 
well, which will induce more tax revenue loss to the government and more welfare loss to the society. 
Therefore, multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior can induce a vicious circle. 
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6.2.3. Tax Avoidance and Legitimacy Problem 
Multinational corporations try to minimize their tax via transfer pricing manipulation in order to 
achieve shareholder wealth maximization. This is a part of good governance as per stakeholder 
theory managerial branch. However, from the perspective of stakeholder theory normative branch, 
corporations should consider the interests of all the stakeholders which refer to anyone who is 
affected by a corporation’s business activities. Legitimacy theory also emphasizes that corporations 
should have “the rights of the public at large” (Deegan & Unerman, 2011, p.325) or the whole 
society’s best interests at heart and do as what society expects them to do.   
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) stated that corporate tax “is not a voluntary tax” and 
that “the public expects businesses to pay their fair share [of tax]” (BBC, 2012).  All corporations 
have a moral obligation to pay their fair share of tax. This is also supported by the result of World 
Value Survey 2005 – 2006, which presented that no form of cheating in tax is justifiable.  
According to legitimacy theory, corporations have to earn their rights towards resources. In order to 
do so, they try very hard to build up positive images and get legitimated by the society through en-
gaging in activities which contribute to improve the social welfare, such as community development 
projects or donation to the charity. However, tax avoidance behavior makes their efforts wasted. 
Multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior via aggressive transfer pricing manipulation can 
be treated as a breach of the social contract, since it is a violation of both explicit and implicit terms 
in the social contract. Such a behavior would eventually induce sanctions from the society, such as 
declined sales volume. To make it worse, the corporations’ public image would be destroyed and 
their legitimacy would be questioned. 
Christian Aid’s survey about public attitudes to tax avoidance shows clearly that most British 
citizens are angry about multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior and there are public 
actions to boycott corporations who do not pay their fair share of tax. It is a proof that multinational 
corporations’ tax avoidance behavior is not consistent with the social contract that corporations 
agreed upon and the society is imposing sanctions on their breaching behavior. 
A corporation’s image or reputation is a resource for generating future profit. When a corporation’s 
image is damaged and its legitimacy is questioned, its future profitability will be negatively affected. 
In worst case scenario, it can lose its “license to operate”. Tax avoidance by any means will 
eventually cause damage to a corporation’s reputation and bring threats to its legitimacy, since it is 
against the social norm as “fairness” and thereby a breach to the social contract between the 
corporation and the society.    
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As per our analysis above, theoretically tax avoidance behavior will eventually cause legitimacy 
problem for multinational corporations. But in reality, will such a conflictual behavior of 
multinational corporations’ really bring threats to corporations’ legitimacy? 
Empirical data shows a very different story. Sales of those corporations previously mentioned in the 
empirical part (Forest Laboratories, Inc., Apple Inc. and SABMiller) did not go down because of 
their tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing manipulation. Among these financial data in the 
empirical part, Apple’s financial performance is very eye catching, even if the corporation is accused 
of shifting two-thirds of its pre-tax global income for the purpose of tax avoidance. Apple’s domestic 
and international net sales increased continuously during 2011 to 2013 and the first two quarter 
reports in 2014 present increases on both quarterly revenue and net profit. The international sales in 
the second quarter, which accounts for the greater part of the second quarter’s revenue, has also 
increased. Sales for iPhones and iPads in the first quarter even created the all-time quarterly records. 
An endangered legitimacy can be indicated by the declining sales due to the general public’s boycott 
against the products from corporations which do not pay their fair share of tax. However, our empiri-
cal data shows that those multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior does not threaten their 
legitimacy in reality, because their net sales and revenue are still increasing. Theoretically, tax 
avoidance behavior should eventually cause legitimacy problem, but why does it not bring threats to 
corporations’ legitimacy in reality? An obvious answer is that the general public are not concerned 
enough about corporations’ tax planning behavior to take actions such as boycotting their products.  
As per our survey, the prominent reason for the general public not being very interested in corpora-
tions’ tax planning is a lack of publicity. Our interviews with the major Swedish media companies 
showed that there are three main reasons for not having a wide media coverage about tax planning: 1) 
It is not interesting enough to arouse the emotions of the public; 2) Tax planning is kind of “old news” 
and it’s troublesome to find attractive angles to report; 3) Tax planning is such a complicated issue 
that it is hard for both the public and journalists to understand properly without professional 
knowledge. Out of the reasons mentioned above, the media often does not regard tax planning as a 
good topic, which leads to a lack of public awareness about tax planning. Therefore, there is not 
enough public concern to create a threat against corporations’ legitimacy.    
6.2.4. Is Legitimacy Theory Applicable for the Issue of Tax Planning? 
To advance further with our analysis, another issue of concern is whether legitimacy theory is 
applicable and appropriate for the subject of tax planning via transfer pricing manipulation. Assume 
that corporations’ tax avoidance behavior will lead to legitimacy problem, the first question to be 
addressed is: When would corporations actually start to face the legitimacy problem? Our answer is: 
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when people get to know the negative effects of corporations’ tax avoidance behavior and start to 
boycott their products. Based on this assumption, we would like to further our study by separating 
the possible occurrence of the legitimacy problem induced by tax avoidance behavior into two 
phases as showing in figure 2.  
Figure 2: Basic Flow Chart about the Occurrence of the Legitimacy Problem 
In figure 2, our assumption in phase 1 is that a corporation’s tax avoidance behavior would lead to 
the legitimacy problem which would be presented in the form of such as declining sales. However, 
the empirical data about corporations’ financial performances and our analysis based on the 
empirical data do not support this assumption. We think that the main reason for a lack of 
consistence between the legitimacy theory and the reality might lie in the products themselves, 
namely the brands and patents. For example, people will choose to buy an IPhone, even if there are 
phones of other brands with similar technology and performance. The reason behind this choice is 
the strong brand effect of Apple which makes IPhone a unique product. And thus there will be no 
clear substitutes for it. As a result, people will not stop buying IPhones just because Apple avoids 
paying their fair share of tax. A similar argument can be made for customers’ continuous purchasing 
of certain medicine from corporations, such as Forest Laboratories Inc., that hold exclusive rights to 
the patents of the medicine, especially when the medicine is considered to be the best or the most 
effective of its kinds. 
Additionally, our survey shows that there is a lack of concern among the general public for tax 
planning. We consider this to be another major cause for why the sales of these four corporations in 
the empirical data do not correspond well with the legitimacy theory. This is however something that 
should have been included into the scope of the legitimacy theory; something that could shed light on 
the fact that social expectations might not have yet heightened enough to make tax avoidance 
behavior be considered as a serious breach of the implicit terms in the social contract. 
During phase 2, a corporation’s tax planning scheme becomes a court case and the ruling is not in the 
favor of the corporation. In such circumstances, the corporation’s tax avoidance behavior breaches 
the explicit terms in the social contract. Theoretically speaking, corporations involving in tax dispute 
should face legitimacy problem and receive sanctions from society, for example in the form of 
falling sales. However, our empirical data shows that the sales of such corporations have not 
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decreased, no matter whether they are in the middle of court process of tax dispute or they have been 
found guilty of tax avoidance. For example, from 2009 to 2011, SABMiller had a tax dispute case in 
the Delhi High Court, India, which is involving the transferring of intangible assets, such as Foster’s 
brand name and patent, to SABMiller.  
A guilty verdict for a corporation’s tax dispute case denotes that the corporation’s tax avoidance 
behavior is considered to be illegal. Such a behavior is a breaching of the explicit terms in the social 
contract and there should be a change of the corporation’s behavior related to tax planning. An 
important thing to point out here is that the breach of the social contract is mainly between 
government and corporations. Our survey and interviews about the public attitudes towards 
corporations’ tax planning behavior reveal that the general public does not care about tax planning to 
the extent that they will regard it as a serious breach of the social contract. Therefore, they continue 
to buy the company's products. In reality, therefore, legitimacy problem does not exist in phase 2, 
either.  
Furthermore, convicted corporations will change their tax planning behavior due to the punishments 
imposed on them according to law. However, due to their internal motives of manipulating transfer 
pricing – profit maximization goal, corporations will continue to find loopholes in the laws and 
regulations related to transfer pricing and practice regulatory arbitrage for the tax purpose, as long as 
the social expectations have not heightened enough to regard tax avoidance behavior as a serious 
breach of social contract. Based on our analysis above, we conclude that corporations’ tax avoidance 
behavior via transfer pricing manipulation will not cause legitimacy problem for corporations and 
thus legitimacy theory is not applicable for the issue of tax planning.  
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7. Conclusion and Discussion 
This part presents the conclusion based on the analysis. Furthermore, suggestions about reducing 
multinational corporations’ incentive to engage in tax motivated transfer pricing manipulation are 
given.  
7.1. Conclusion 
Multinational corporations have both internal and external motives to manipulate transfer pricing in 
order to shift their profits between high- and low-tax jurisdictions. The profit maximization goal 
characterizes the internal motive for transfer pricing manipulation; globalization, tax haven, different 
practices of tax regulations and the difficulty to appropriately apply the arm’s length principle pro-
vide external environment for multinational corporations to manipulate transfer pricing in order to 
avoid corporation taxes.  
Corporations’ aggressive manipulation of transfer pricing often leads to tax evasion and tax fraud, 
which obviously breach the social contract and such behaviors will induce the sanctions according to 
laws and regulations. Tax avoidance behavior lies more in a grey area. From the perspective of legit-
imacy theory, it is a breach of the social contract, since it is against the norm of fairness and thereby 
violates the implicit terms in the social contract. Theoretically, multinational corporations’ tax avoid-
ance behavior will cause legitimacy problem for them. However, in reality such a behavior does not 
really endanger their legitimacy due to a lack of public concern, which is majorly caused by a lack of 
media exposure. The brand effect and the uniqueness of the products also explain the lack of consist-
ence between legitimacy theory and reality.  
No matter whether the general public knows about corporations’ tax avoidance behavior or not; no 
matter whether corporations are in the middle of the court process of tax disputes or have been found 
guilty, tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing manipulation will not cause legitimacy problem 
for corporations and thus legitimacy theory is not applicable for the issue of tax planning. 
7.2. Discussion 
Even if multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing manipulation will not 
cause legitimacy problem, it is still unethical and harmful to the society. How can we stop such a be-
havior or, at least, reduce multinational corporations’ incentives to engage in such a behavior? 
Elliott (2013) argues that corporations will only change for one of three reasons: 1) forced to change 
due to the pressure from customers; 2) forced to change because of compliance with law and regula-
tions; 3) spontaneous change in order to operate in accord with moral sentiments (Elliott, 2013). 
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We suggest, as per Elliott’s arguments, giving greater publicity to multinational corporations’ tax 
avoidance behavior; reducing the arbitrage opportunities for transfer pricing manipulation and 
changing the rationalization of tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing manipulation. Lessening 
of arbitrage opportunities will involve strengthening and harmonization of regulation such as chang-
ing of tax policies and accounting standards at both national and international level. Changing ra-
tionalization requires strengthening of the ethical training related to tax planning via transfer pricing 
manipulation.  
Greater Publicity to Tax Avoidance Behavior 
Based on Theory of Moral Sentiments by Adam Smith, Elliott (2013) argues that “it is up to 
consumers and voters to change the lousy behaviour” of big companies (Elliott, 2013). He points out 
that according to Adam Smith, many problems “would be solved if only people could hold up a 
mirror and see themselves ‘in the light in which others see us’ (Elliott, 2013). Therefore, 
corporations would like to “be held in high esteem by their customers” (Elliott, 2013).  
We suggest a greater publicity to corporations’ tax planning in order to make the general public 
know those severe negative impacts tax avoidance behavior brings about. Corporations’ behavior can 
be forced to change due to the pressure from the attitudes of their customers. Starbucks’ volunteering 
to pay extra corporate tax in the UK is a good example. BBC News reported in June 2013 that 
Starbucks started to pay UK corporate tax for first time since 2009 after avoiding UK corporation tax 
for 14 years. Furthermore, Starbucks decided to pay an extra £5 million later in 2013 due to “the bad 
publicity and the pressure from politicians and campaigners” (BBC, 2013). Starbucks spokeswoman 
claimed that Starbucks listened to customers and responded to the public anger (including the 
proposal of boycotting Starbucks) over the revelation of the corporation’s tax avoidance behavior. 
Thus, Starbucks decided to pay £10 million in corporate tax in 2013 and another £10 million in 2014 
(BBC, 2013).   
Reducing the Arbitrage Opportunities 
Our analysis concluded that tax avoidance, from corporations’ perspective, most probably will not 
cause legitimacy problem, since the sales did not decline, which is because the general public are not 
concerned enough about corporations’ tax planning behavior to boycott the products. However, it 
does not mean that the governments are happy about multinational corporations’ tax planning behav-
ior. The G20’s strong support towards OECDs BEPS project and the continuous revisions of old reg-
ulations as well as the creations of new regulations are proofs for governments’ actions to tackle tax 
avoidance behavior. We suggest and call for more similar actions which aim at harmonizing and 
strengthening the laws and regulations related to transfer pricing, in order to reduce the arbitrage op-
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portunities for transfer pricing manipulation. The co-operation between both governmental and non-
governmental representatives takes into account not only the government’s point of view but also the 
perspective of business and civil society.  This may lead to better harmonized regulations. 
Changing the Rationalization of Tax Avoidance Behavior 
Multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing manipulation is a conflictual 
behavior and it is categorized as business ethical issue. Such a conflictual behavior can be viewed 
from two different perspectives. Seen from the corporation’s perspective on one hand, the tax avoid-
ance behavior is merely a way to reduce costs, which is part of a sound business plan. It is thus con-
sistent with the corporation’s professional ethics, because it fits well for the primary goal of the cor-
poration as a whole – profit maximization. According to Hansen, Crosser and Laufer (1992), tax 
avoidance is allowed by the law and it therefore gives practitioners the right to choose it as an alter-
native (Hansen, Crosser & Laufer, 1992, p. 683).  
On the other hand, seen from the perspective of the whole society and from the ethical perspective, 
following laws, regulations or rules is not always equivalent to being ethical – “doing the right thing" 
(Hansen, Crosser & Laufer, 1992, p. 684). It is not illegal to bend the rules and regulations of the tax 
system, but such a behavior is inconsistent with the spirit of the law. Companies have choices for 
interpreting the tax law and they draw their ethical line concerning the interpretation of tax law and 
their business arrangements. Corporations’ tax avoidance behavior is regarded as an immoral and 
unethical practice which negatively affects the integrity of the tax system (IBE, 2013, p.1).  
Moreover, multinational corporations’ tax avoidance behavior via transfer pricing manipulation is 
harmful to the society because it causes loss of social welfare; it is against the moral ethics, since 
such a behavior is against the social norm of “fairness”, which thereby breaches the “social contract”; 
and it is an evasion to corporate social responsibility.  
There should be no distinction between professional and moral ethics. Tax practitioners should be 
driven by doing right thing and not just blindly do what is allowed by the law (Hansen, Crosser & 
Laufer, 1992, p. 684). Eden and Smith (2011) emphasized that it is important to include ethical train-
ing related to transfer pricing manipulation as “part of the tax planning community’s professional 
recertification activities” (Eden & Smith, 2011, p. 26). They also pointed out that this type of training 
should focus on “comparing tax and moral ethics, determining the ‘bright line’ where a TPM [trans-
fer pricing manipulation’ action becomes unethical, and taxation in the context of corporate social 
responsibility” (Eden & Smith, 2011, p.26-27). They also recommend that ethics of transfer pricing 
should be included in business school teaching agenda, “particularly in accounting and MBA courses” 
(Eden & Smith, 2011, p.27). 
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The tax payment is not just a legal issue; it should be regarded as a moral and ethical issue. Re-
searchers call for “a development of a transfer pricing hypernom”, which transfer pricing manipula-
tion is regarded as corporate fraud and socially irresponsible (Eden & Smith, 2011, p.27). Eden and 
Smith proposed two ways for developing such a hyper-norm: 1) regarding abusive transfer pricing as 
corrupt behaviors of firms and including it into the principles of the UN Global Compact (UN Global 
Compact provides a series of standards or hyper-norms for corporations); 2) extending the work of 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and Wolfsberg Group about trade finance principles (Eden & 
Smith, 2011, p. 28). The principles from both organizations are designed only for stopping money 
laundering activities by trade mispricing. Eden and Smith (2011) suggested extending FATF’s work 
and Principles in order to create “a set of more general norms for transfer pricing” (Eden and Smith, 
2011, p.28).       
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